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Reading about the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre always brings in different perspective 
depending on the nationality of the authors, with few exceptions. But the one thing that remains 
constant in most works is the rise of Indian nationalist movements after this event. This paper 
will examine the history behind the massacre and add to the discourse that this was a planned 
event by the British empire. This paper will also analyze Vol. II of the Report of the 
Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee source that has been available for 100 
years and yet has been underutilized by the authors. Whether it is intentional or not could be 
argued, as the focus in the works researched for this paper has always been about the massacre 
and its instigator and not about the people. This paper will take one step towards focusing on the 
people from a social history perspective by adding a chapter focusing on that source. There has 
been some usage of the source by some authors (which will be shown further in this paper) but 
only to support the authors arguments. There has been nothing on it which gives the source 
justice in its usage in terms of social history or analysis of it. As this paper will have an overview 
of the massacre and the arguments made in those sources it will achieve the goal of summarizing 
the event while also having a special focus on the people that are left out of the narrative. 
In 1919 Amritsar was the second most important city of the Punjab, with a population of 
160,000 (One Lakh and Sixty Thousand). It was a famous religious town as the Golden Temple 
of the Sikhs was located there. Amritsar was also an important commercial center, but its trade 
had suffered due to the war and consequent price rise. The city had recently become important in 
a political sense as the Indian National Congress had established an office there. The 1919 All 
Indian Congress Committee annual meeting was scheduled to be held in Amritsar, and honor-
bound to lead to greater political awareness within the city as it was led by Motilal Nehru (1861-
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1931) president of the Indian National Congress.1 
Sunday, April 13, 1919, was the day of the Baisakhi festival, which marked the 
anniversary of the creation of the Khalsa or Sikh community.2 Coinciding with the cattle and 
horse fair, this was the biggest mela, or Festival, in the province and every year it attracted 
thousands of visitors and pilgrims. Inside an open space, surrounded by buildings and a 
crumbling brick wall, a large Indian crowd of thousands had gathered around a Sikh man 
addressing his audience from a platform. There was a small, dilapidated temple within the square 
and few trees, and behind the rooftops, the unmistakable onion-domes of a mosque could be 
discerned. People were mostly dressed in varying white shades, yet the bearded men’s colorful 
turbans provide a stark contrast to the drab grey houses behind them. Close around the speaker, 
the audience was sitting down while, on the outskirts of the crowd, people were standing or 
moving about, and a vendor was busy peddling his wares carried on a pole across his shoulder. 
Elsewhere in the city, an armored car emerged from a gate, followed by a military vehicle with 
two British officers in pith helmets and fifty Indian troops with rifles making up the rear. The 
cars and uniforms were all in the same khaki colors, and the slouch hat and pointed turbans of 
the troops revealed them to be Gurkhas and Baluchis. The engines’ rumble merged with the 
soldiers trotting behind the cars’ rhythmic sound as the column wound its way through the 
narrow streets of Amritsar. The commanding officer, the broom-mustachioed General Reginald 
Edward Harry Dyer (1864-1927) was sitting motionless in the car, looking straight ahead, as they 
drove past residents who stopped what they were doing and stared at the procession. General 
 
1 Savita Narain, The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 1919 (Surrey: Spantech and Lancer, 1998), 
26 
2 Indian festival celebrated in by Hindu and Sikh mostly in Punjab and some parts of North India to welcome Spring 
Season. It is also the day that Sikhs celebrate the commemoration of the formation of Khalsa Panth of warriors 
under Guru Gobind Singh. 
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Dyer looked at the gathering and ordered the soldiers to fix the bayonets. As the first row of 
soldiers assumed a kneeling position, more people were getting up, visibly worried. Dyer gave 
an order to the Havildar-Major, and the double line of troops lifted their rifles to aim with one 
synchronized movement. After ignoring his inferior’s request to give the public a warning, Dyer 
barked the order: “Fire!” All fifty troops fired simultaneously, and the sharp report of volley 
reverberated between the walls of the surrounding buildings. Panic set in among the people. 
Some tried to escape by scaling the wall, but Dyer promptly directed the fire towards them.3 
Another important source to add to this narrative apart from the newspapers reports and 
the secondary work is an eyewitness account. A young kid aged 15, Lala Parmanand witnessed 
the event from the roof of a temple close by at a height of about 20ft. He mentions that a Sikh 
was addressing the gathering of about 20,000 and people were continuously pouring in to 
celebrate the Baisakhi festival. As he saw the Gurkhas armed with rifles forming two lines and 
pointing the rifles towards the crowd then he heard a sound of whistle followed by the report of 
firing lasting about 10 minutes. He went upstairs after the firing had ceased and saw 1,500 
people lying wounded and dead all over the garden.4 This description aligns with most of the 
other descriptions that people saw from different location surrounding the Bagh. 
April 13 is always remembered as the Baisakhi of death and an event that jump-started 
Indian Independence’s movement from the British Empire.5 “It is important to remember that 
that massacre came after hundreds of thousands of Indians had fought alongside British troops in 
the First World War. At the time of the killings, Winston Churchill, British Secretary of State for 
 
3 Kim A. Wagner, Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear and The Making of a Massacre (Yale University: New Haven, 
2019), xiii-xiv. 
4 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 93-4. 
5 Religious festival in Hinduism and Sikhism. It is usually celebrated on April 13 or 14 every year since the 
sixteenth century to commemorate the formation of warriors under Guru Gobind Singh. The event is considered to 
be the harvest festival in Hinduism. 
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War, described the atrocity as a “monstrous event” that was “without precedent or parallel in the 
British Empire’s modern history.”6 The Bagh’s public meeting had been hastily arranged, 
showing the people’s spontaneous urge to lead a revolt against Britain’s Lieutenant Governor of 
Punjab, Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyer (1864-1940).7 He was the administrator in India at the 
time of the massacre. He was single-minded, dynamic, and skillful in organizing Punjab for the 
war effort.8 It is under his orders that Dyer executed this massacre.9 
As a result of the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, Secretary of State for India, Edwin 
Samuel Montagu (1879-1924) formed The Hunter committee. It consisted of honorable Lord 
William Hunter as President, Solicitor-General for Scotland and Senator of the College of 
Justice. Under him served the honorable Mr. Justice George Claus Rankin (1877–1946), the 
honorable Mr. Walter Francis Rice, Major-General Sir George Barrow, the honorable Pandit 
Jagat Narayan, the honorable Mr. Thomas Smith Sir Chimanlal Harilal Setalvad, and Sardar 
Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan. According to Mr. Montagu “the committee was chosen after the 
most careful consideration, with one single desire and motive, to get an impartial tribunal to 
discharge the most thankless duty to the best of their ability was, I maintain, such a body. I resent 
very much the insolent criticisms that have been passed either on the European Members, civil 
and military, or upon the distinguished Indian members, each of whom has a record of loyal and 
patriotic public service.”10 
 
6 Emma Reynolds, Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 658 Parliamentary Debate House of Commons (6th ser) (2019) cols. 
53WH. 
7 Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyer (1864-1940), was born in County Tipperary. His Anglo-Irish background probably 
gave him pre-conceived ideas of his duties as lieutenant-Governor of Punjab. He was appointed to the post in 
December 1912 and held it until 1919. 
8 O’Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940) May 25, 2006, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
9 Raja Ram, The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A Premeditated Plan (Chandigarh: Panjab University Publication 
Bureau, 1969), VII. 
10 Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter’s Committee, “The Parliamentary Debates: Army Council 
and General Dyer.” Hansard Committee Debate, London, 131, July 8, 1920. 
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General Dyer played a central role as he was the instigator of this Massacre of India’s 
innocent people. While addressing the Hunter committee investigating his crimes at the 
Jallianwala Bagh, General Dyer stated “I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed, 
and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and 
widespread effect it was my duty to produce if I was to justify my action. If more troops had 
been at hand, the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of 
merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect. From a military 
point of view, not only on those who were present but more specially throughout the Punjab. 
There could be no question of undue severity.”11 The firing at Jallianwala Bagh continued 
without interruption for ten to fifteen minutes, during which 1,650 rounds were expended, killing 
an officially estimated 379 and wounding 1,200 men, women, and children. Dyer then 
immediately withdrew, leaving the dead, dying, and injured unattended.12 According to Dyer (as 
he told in the Hunter Committee), this treatment was necessary to inflict a lesson that would 
impact India.13 
The returning Indian soldiers from the First World War were supported by Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi (Ji)’s (1869-1948) fury of non-violent marches and his political support by 
India’s elites, like Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became the first prime minister of independent 
India in1947.14 The soldiers felt betrayed by the Raj as their unarmed and peaceful families 
gathered to celebrate a festival were massacred, and the ones that could have been saved were 
 
11 Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter’s Committee, “The Parliamentary Debates: Army Council 
and General Dyer.” Hansard Committee Debate, London, 131, July 8, 1920. 
12 Dyer, Reginald Edward Harry (1864-1927) May 24, 2008, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
13 William Hunter, Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-20 Appointed by the Government of India to 
Investigate Disturbances in Punjab, Delhi and Bombay, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920), 8 
14 Ji is written as a form of respect to the elders in the Indian Culture. As he is considered a Mahatma which is a  
great soul, I always write his name ending with Ji.; Encyclopædia Britannica, (2015), s.v. “List of Prime Ministers 
of India”; Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter’s Committee, “The Parliamentary Debates: Army 
Council and General Dyer.” Hansard Committee Debate, London, 131, July 8, 1920. 
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left there to die.15 This brutality had shown to the people of India that their oppressors could no 
longer be tolerated, and they deserve a “Home Rule” in a world that fought for democracy.16 The 
Hunter Committee censured Dyer in support of Edwin Montagu but the question of whether to 
employ him or not was debated. This chapter will focus on the rise of Nationalism in India after 
this event and the spark that changed the British Empire’s fate forever while giving India her 
freedom in 1947. This chapter will further prove how it was a domino effect against the Raj, 
where they had to leave their dominance and slowly lost the Empire’s power. “Gandhi (Ji)’s joint 
efforts of non-violent movements and the knowledge of the English laws and military tactics 
with some of the violent protests by the revolutionaries like Udham Singh, who assassinated 
O’Dwyer, gave India the freedom she deserved.”17 
It was not just the brutality of the massacre but also the brutal nature of the British 
towards anyone regardless of their age. An example of this is the statement from the youngest 
person, 13 years old Brij Lal. He was asked if he had given any statements before the police to 
which he said “Yes”, and he had to make the statement 20 days after the firing in Jallianwala 
Bagh when one Sub-Inspector and two constables came and took him to Kotwali. He was kept in 
custody there for 9 days and was never allowed to answer even call of nature without being 
attended by a constable. After being tortured to sleep on the bare floor and beaten and canned by 
constables he gave up and made a false statement to the Inspector stating that “If Hindus and 
Mohammadans (another name for Muslims) unite Government can do nothing”. This shows that 
the Amritsar Conspiracy Case was even though false, but people were being tortured to make it 
 
15 Raj is a  Hindi term which translates into the ruler/king/emperor/power. It was meant specially for the British as 
they ruled India for the longest time. 
16 Encyclopædia Britannica, (2013), s.v. “Home Rule League.” 
17 Singh, Udham (1899–1940) January 3, 2008, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
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true in accordance with the hearing.18 
During the Great War, Punjab provided 360,000 recruits, more than half the number 
provided by India’s whole during the war.19 By the end of the war, one male Punjabi in every 
twenty-eight had been mobilized.20 India’s participation in the First World War as part of the 
British Empire carried profound implications from political, economic, social, and military 
perspectives. By December 1919, the Indians contributed a total of 1,440,437 (14 lakhs 40 
thousand 437, 1.4 million) workforce, which comprised of 877,068 (8 lakhs 77 thousand and 68) 
combatants and 563,369 (5 lakhs 63 thousand 369) non-combatants. An estimated 239,561 (2 
lakhs 39 thousand 561) men served in the British Indian army in 1914, making a total of 
1,679,998 (16 lakhs 79 thousand 998) soldiers contributing for the war effort by the end of First 
World War.21 According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission’s annual report of 
2007-2008, the soldiers identified burials were 8,054, and the soldiers that were commemorated 
on Memorials were 66,136. The total loss of life was 74,190 soldiers.22 
The contribution of the First World War towards the victory had not earned it 
respectability as a colony, but rather a burden of the poorer country. To those soldiers in Punjab, 
Jallianwala Bagh shattered the faith that the people had in the British sense of justice and 
fairness. To most native Indians, the unarmed massacre was a betrayal of the trust that they had 
placed on the British to rule them wisely, justly, and with fairness. “In the average Indian’s eyes, 
the just, fair, and liberal Englishman suddenly turned into a ruthless, bloodthirsty tyrant who 
 
18 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 64-6. 
19 O’Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940) May 25, 2006, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
20 O’Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940) May 25, 2006, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
21 Santanu Das, ed., Race, Empire and First World War Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
70. 
22 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report 2007-08, July 31, 2008, 53. 
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could not be trusted.”23 On this sense of betrayal, Gandhi (Ji) built his mass movement, which 
put a premium on breaking the rulers’ laws. It proved a spectacular problem on how to carry the 
Indian people in support of the war efforts. For the Indian leaders, it proved equally a 
complicated problem on how to support the government in its war objectives and fight for 
national aspirations.24 
According to a history study documentary written and directed by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), soldiering was an honorable tradition in India, and the British 
capitalized on this.25 The British regimented India’s workforce as the backbone of their military 
power. Indian troops helped the British control their Empire, playing a crucial role in fighting for 
Britain right from November 1914 to 1919. Some recent research suggests that British rule had 
accomplished little for India in economic terms.26 
Indian soldiers returning from China, Egypt, France, East Africa, and Gallipoli after 
fighting the First World War under the British Empire felt the “othering” from the white soldiers 
as seen in the letters that they wrote to their families in India.27 The letters also stated that they 
were treated like slaves because they were asked to do other soldiers’ chores and clean their 
quarters.28 The returning soldiers saw the horrifying act of killing a non-violent crowd by an 
 
23 M. Venkaiah Naidu, “Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: The End Game,” Mathrubhumi (English Edition), April 13, 
2019. 
24 Budheswar Pati, India and The First World War (New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher and Distributors, 1996), 1-2. 
25 Why was India so Valuable to the British Empire? Secondary Sources in British Broadcasting Corporation Teach, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/teach/class-clips-video/gcse-history-why-was-india-so-valuable-to-the-british-
Eempire/zv2rwty#:~:text=India%20was%20the%20jewel%20in,backbone%20of%20their%20military%20power. 
26 Tirthankar Roy “The British Empire and the Economic Development of India (1858-1947),” Revista De Historia 
Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 34 no. 2 (2016), Cambridge University 
Press, 209–36.; Monica Roy, “Economic Impact of the British Rule in India,” Indian History, 
https://www.historydiscussion.net/british-india/economic-impact-of-the-british-rule-in-india-indian-history/6317. 
27 “Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?” TNA, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 
143/86. 




English general whom they believed to be a close friend.29 When the wives, daughters, sisters, 
and other family members were massacred in the name of disobedience in Amritsar, they 
observed this horror in disbelief.30 In the witnesses’ eyes, there could not be any justification that 
could be considered valid for General Dyer’s actions, specifically the killing of the innocents in 
the name of obedience.31 After enduring the prejudice in the war, the returning soldiers from 
Punjab are horrified and angry as Dyer massacred the civilians of the Bagh gathered there for the 
Baisakhi Festival.32 The overarching theme of the war was Nationalism and the alliance of 
several countries, and Indian’s felt betrayed as they were also part of Imperial society. At the 
same time, the soldiers had fought a war that had opposed Imperialism. The horrific massacre 
occurred between two World Wars, which makes the rise of Nationalism a crucial point in the 
literature of the last 50 years as the political aspect changed after the Indian independence from 
the British empire in 1947.33 Consider, for example Producing India: From Colonial Economy 
to National Space by Manu Goswami published in 2004 and Imperial Crime and Punishment: 
The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgment, 19I9-I920 by Helen Fein published in 
1977. 
Many scholars focus on Gandhi (Ji) as the center of the rise of Nationalism and his 
organization of the anti-British non-violent civil disobedience movement and the Gandhi-Irwin 
pact before the Second Round Table Conference in 1931 convened in London.34 In this pact, 
 
29 Army Council and General Dyer, “Punjab Disturbances: Lord Hunter’s Committee,” Commons Sitting, July 1920, 
TNA. 
30 “Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?” TNA, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 
143/86. 
31 Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners, Vol. II (Evidence), TNA. 
32 Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners, Vol. II (Evidence), TNA. 
33 Helen Fein, Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgement, 1919-
1920 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1977), 72. 




Lord Irwin promised that if Gandhi (Ji) agreed to call off the Salt March campaign, which placed 
special strains on the British – not just because of the power that he had to organize millions but 
because civil disobedience may have slowed down the British offer to India for Dominion status 
that was given to the British Commonwealth nations.35 The meaning of Dominion states that 
“The main characteristics of dominion status were complete legislative authority as provided in 
the Statute of Westminster (1931) and, in the executive sphere.”36 While “Internationally, it 
connoted the recognition of the dominions (except Newfoundland) as separate states, entitled to 
separate representation in the League of Nations and other international bodies.”37 As the 
countries that were once enslaved started to get their independence, “after 1947 the use of the 
expression was abandoned because it was thought in some quarters to imply a form of 
subordination, and the phrase “members of the Commonwealth” came into use.”38 
The Allies claimed they fought the war to make it safe for Democracy. According to 
Woodrow Wilson, “The real problem of Democracy, therefore, is how to devise and maintain in 
full efficiency the best means of intimate counsel between those who are to make and administer 
the laws and those who are to obey them...governments should retain their power as it is that [the 
citizenry] should be free...modern Democracy speaks always of the sovereignty of the people, 
and of rulers as the people’s servants...Modern Democracy is Government subject to systematic 
popular control.”39 This news spread around the world. It was a powerful message that could 
easily be gleaned from the approximately 200 Indian English language newspapers.40 From the 
 
35 Pratt, “The Indian Round Table Conference: Second Session,” 151-2. 
36 Encyclopædia Britannica, (2011), s.v. “Dominion.” 
37 Encyclopædia Britannica, (2011), s.v. “Dominion.” 
38 Encyclopædia Britannica, (2011), s.v. “Dominion.” 
39 Tony Smith, Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 31. 
40 British Library, Indian Newspaper Reports, c 1868-1942, from the British Library, London. (Marlborough: Adam 
Matthew Publications, 2005), http://explore.bl.uk/BLVU1:LSCOP-ALL:BLL01013361037. 
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Indian perspective, however, the British had gone to war against the same people they had 
enslaved in the name of obedience and loyalty.41 
The impact of race and racism was seen in many letters sent home to India, even after 
heavy censorship. On the one hand, the soldiers were grateful that they were serving their king in 
a war that was fought for freedom from the oppressors, while on the other, the soldiers felt the 
pressure and “othering” by the white soldiers.42 “Race and racism helped shape both the 
approaches of combatant nations to waging World War One and the experience of the war for 
millions of people among the European public and in European colonies in Africa and Asia. 
From the colour of their skins, to the content of their religious beliefs, colonized peoples’ 
attributes were of major concern to those making decisions about how and where to wage war. In 
fact, the very racial and cultural differences of non-European peoples gave European colonial 
powers a sense of entitlement to rule their colonial possessions in the first place.”43 
It is also imperative not to forget the terrible famines that devastated India. As the unrest 
among the Indians kept growing as shown above. These were partly the result of weather but 
partly caused by British policies. Food shortages came about because Indians were growing cash 
crops.44 When famine struck in 1876 -77 and 1899 - 1900, the Foreign Office was utterly 
overwhelmed and could not organize a significant enough relief effort. As well as these massive 
famines, there were many other smaller, more localized famines.45 According to George 
 
41 Harriet Sherwood, “Indians in the Trenches: Voices of Forgotten Army are Finally to be Heard,” The Guardian, 
October 27, 2018. 
42 “Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?”, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 143/86, 
TNA. 
43 “Race, Racism and Military Strategy”, British Library, 2014, https://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/race-
racism-and-military-strategy. 
44 Case Study 4 Background: Living in the British Empire, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) 
(Catalogue ref: Copy 1/59 f.371). 
45 Case Study 4 Background: Living in the British Empire, TNA. 
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Harwood, in 1908 (Member of Parliament from Manchester), feeding the Indian population was 
the problem pressing upon the British. He stated that “in India, more than half the population 
were not only near the famine line but over it; and the nine-tenths of the working population 
were not fed. He did not see what could be done to avoid the famines that would occur almost 
yearly.”46 
The British considered the massacre as a singular event, and Derek Sayer’s insight is 
enlightening, in the words of Arthur Swinson, “This stems, I believe, from more than 
embarrassment in the face of one of the less glorious chapters in British history.”47 “The 
construction of the Amritsar Massacre from the start as “singular and sinister” marginalizes it. 
There has been no need felt to agonize over Amritsar as in any sense a national shame because it 
is aberrant, in a category by itself, not part of the national history at all.”48  
The British passed the Rowlatt Act as an emergency measure to cope with the 
revolutionary outbreaks that British officials feared in India during the First World War.49 Since 
the Sepoys were sent off to war and very few local police monitored people’s positions in Punjab 
and various parts of India.50 The bills were focused on Punjab and Bengal as most protesters 
came from there, and there was anger amongst the people of Bengal because of the partition. The 
Rowlatt Acts, passed by the Imperial Legislative Council (the legislature of British India), 
allowed certain political cases to be tried without juries and permitted internment of suspects 
without trial and replaced the wartime Defence of India Act (1915) and were based on the report 
 
46 “British Rule in India: Mr. Harwood, M.P., On Some of The Problems Population and Famine India and Self-
Government the Religious Question,” The Manchester Guardian, Feb. 24, 1908. 
47 Arthur Swinson, Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and the Amritsar Affair (London: P. Davies, 
1964), 45. 
48 Derek Sayer, “British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920,” Past and Present, 10, (1970): 132. 
49 Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners, Vol. I (Report), 1920, 24. 
50 Sepoys are the British way of saying Sipahis, which means soldiers. 
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of Justice S.A.T. Rowlatt’s committee of 1918.”51  
Gandhi (Ji) opposed the bills in a Satyagraha pledge that said, “Being conscientiously of 
opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, No. I of 1919, and 
the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, No. II of 1919, are unjust, subversive of the 
principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which 
the safety of the community, as a whole, and the state itself, is based, we solemnly affirm that, in 
the event of these Bills becoming law. Until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey 
these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit. We 
further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, 
person or property.”52 Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the 
discontent caused by the city’s many problems. It is possible to understand the use of such 
powers when all available fighting material had been removed from India to the battlefields of 
France and Mesopotamia, and when India’s internal peace had to depend largely upon the loyalty 
and the peace-loving nature of the people.”53  
 
51 Encyclopædia Britannica, (2014), s.v. “Rowlatt Acts.” 
52 Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners, 26. 
53 Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners, 24. 
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Historical Analysis and the Undervalued Source 
 
This chapter will focus on one of the most undervalued sources which has, though not 
entirely, but been overlooked by the authors. The Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the 
Punjab Sub Committee of the Indian National Congress Vol II includes interviews from more 
than 500 people located in and around Amritsar during the month of April and March. These 
interviews are from people that either experienced the massacre firsthand and survived to tell the 
story and the people that were around Jallianwala Bagh during the Massacre. The interviews 
were conducted from different age group and different professions to provide a better 
understanding of the emotions of people. The age differentiation is from 13 years old to 75 years 
old.54 One exception of Kishan Singh whose age is not provided but should be around 12 years 
from the information given.55 The interviews also contain people from different professions, 
some are Barristers while some were shopkeepers around the Bagh. Some were students in 
universities and schools in Amritsar. There were also wives and fathers of the people that were 
killed, and their bodies were identified.  
This source has been used by very few authors and still only a fraction of these interviews 
 
54 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 64 and 73. 
55 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 296. 
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has been utilized. Authors like Lloyd have only focused on it to support their argument about the 
horrors of the Massacre.56 It is not utilized to its complete extent from a Social History 
perspective where the history can be looked at from bottom up. It has been used as a secondary 
source to substantiate the authors argument. Whether it is to support the horrors of the event or to 
show the unjust nature of the British Empire towards the Indians in the form of Rowlatt Act. 
In this chapter, the focus will be to understand what the massacre meant to the people in 
Punjab and surrounding states and to prove that the rumors about retaliation were false. The 
rumors which is the basis of passing the Rowlatt Act. The interviewers were the members of the 
commission that included Mr. M. K. Gandhi. People were asked a series of different questions to 
know the details of their whereabouts and showcase the injustice and false information that 
British sources have provided. Question were as simple as “where were you on the 10th of 
April?”, to “Kindly tell us what happened on the 13th?” and depending on the answers they were 
asked “Up until then, did you hear of any movement amongst the people in the villages to loot 
the city of Amritsar or to damage Government property in any way?”57 Provided below are some 
of the interviews in their partial form focusing on the questions that matter to the Satyagraha 
movement, Rowlatt act and Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. An attempt to look at nationalism and or 
rebellion sentiment will be done if there is a clear answer towards it in the interviews. 
There are also interviews from the Surgeons and assistant surgeons that noted the people 
being shot as they were running away or climbing over the walls which enclosed the Bagh. The 
examination of the wounds also led the Surgeons to believe that this must have occurred in the 
majority of cases.58 The interviews are not only from Amritsar but, the same scenario was told 
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by the people of Lahore and other cities going as far as Gujrat and Ramnagar.59 One interview is 
from a Medical Practitioner, Dr. Gopi Chand, in Lahore where he lists the patients and their 
wounds on the day of the event as well as during the Martial law on 15th. He describes the 
wounds and their location starting from the tongue with three broken teeth going down to a 
punctured wound over the scrotum. Some wounds looked like they were probed by someone, 
probably in an attempt to remove the bullet that was One and a half inch deep. He treated kids 
below 12 with broken ribs while some older people had even lost their eye to the point that the 
eyeball was protruding. The wounds were 4” long, 2” wide and about 1” deep.60 
The history of the Amritsar massacre is analyzed by looking at articles and books from 
the sixties, with the exception of B.G. Horniman’s work, up until the twenty-first century as the 
secondary work regarding the massacre is written from sixties.61 Horniman’s work is included as 
it provides an immediate analysis of the event which is important to note as it is coming from a 
British nationalist perspective supporting Indian nationalism. The information before sixties is 
explained and analyzed in the sources mentioned below and for a proper analysis secondary 
sources will be used. There are several primary sources that are scattered all across the libraries 
in different parts of the world, but I found the most useful of the sources at Kew which was 
underutilized by the authors that will be mentioned in the final chapter. The focus on writing 
about the Massacre grew in the twenty-first century as the 100-year anniversary was closer. The 
political discourses started to include the remembrance of April 13, 1919, to attract a broader 
audience’s attention. There is no clear indication of why this happened, and it is too early to 
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know a pattern. One notable news item that could have ignited the attention was when Theresa 
May expressed her regret calling it a “shameful scar.”62 However, the prime minister’s 
comments stopped short of an official apology, which Indians have been asking for since 1919. 
There have been ongoing debates in the House of Lords regarding the same.63 It has been 101 
years now and though academic discourse has changed enormously, it has been in the form of 
minute changes in the approach of authors as India’s social and political environment evolved 
from a British colony to an independent country. 
 There are several viewpoints of the Massacre and since the official inquiry began only 
after over five months, many relevant details would have either been obscured or forgotten.64 
The majority of the researchers are either Indian or British, but this incident has also been 
researched by some Americans and Canadians, showing its international importance. It is 
possible to see distinctive trends among these historians because none of the Indian historians 
justify the shooting.65 The various descriptions of the shooting often contradict each other. There 
is no authoritative, fully substantiated account that stands out, but the nationalism and influence 
in perspective sway the version. The only exception to this is B.G. Horniman, whose book 
Amritsar and Our Duty to India, published in 1920, condemns the Massacre.66 Being a British 
writer, such an attitude is seen only in Indian authors and not the other way around. B. G. 
Horniman was a journalist working for a pro-independence newspaper Bombay Chronicle and 
supported Indian independence, hence condemns the massacre. His main theme were complete 
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freedom and parliamentary democracy for India.67 Since the book is published in 1920, which is 
only a year after the incidents, nationalism does not play a large role in the book but is 
approached from his personal experience. Before going into the actual event, there is some 
background information needed to understand the situation. 
The historical and geographical importance of the Punjab has been very rich. It may be 
considered one of the most important provinces of India. It was here that the Aryans of Vedic 
times first made their home. It was here that the hymns of the Rig Veda were first chanted. It was 
to this province, at the great University of Taxila, that seekers after knowledge flocked from 
various parts of the world. It was in this province that the Pandus and the Kaurus, the great 
heroes of the Mahabharata, fought out their great battles. It was here that Osiris, King of Egypt, 
first touched Indian soil and Semiramis, Queen of Assyria, who at the head of her vast armies 
tried her fortune for the dominion of India, suffered a crushing defeat. The Scythians and Tartars 
and Persians had to measure swords with the sons of Punjab in their attempts to penetrate into 
India. It was in this province that Alexander the Great, though victorious, for the first time met a 
foe, under King Porus, who shattered his dream of a worldwide dominion.68 The Punjab was a 
vital region of British India, partly because of its religious diversity, which incorporated 
substantial numbers of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. It also had to be a strong strategic point as 
the province bordering Afghanistan. During the war, disaffection had visibly grown in Punjab. 
Some blame this on the strict administration of Sir Michael O’Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor 
of Punjab. He ruthlessly suppressed the Ghadr (Ghadar/Gadar- rebellion) movement in 1914, 
which had been launched by Sikhs in North America, and severely restricted the Indian press 
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after the movement in 1914. About a third of all Indian army recruits came from Punjab during 
the war, a suspiciously high figure. O’Dwyer’s recruitment methods were often criticized. Many 
claim that bribery, corruption, and force were used in enrolling recruits.69  
Horniman stated that O’Dwyer held a “reign of terror” over Punjab and his deliberate 
plan of concealment.70 Which is also seen in one of the interviews of the Secretary of Punjab 
Mutual Hindu Family Relief Fund, Lala Tola Ram, “In my opinion, Lahore did nothing to 
warrant the application of Martial Law. Lahore acted in the true spirit preached by Mr. Gandhi. 
There was no conspiracy whatsoever. The whole thing was a reign of terror and a continuous 
agony for the law-abiding and peace-loving citizens.”71 This proves that the nationalist identity 
grew amongst people of Punjab and in surrounding places when hearing the news about the 
Massacre and the unjust nature of Martial Law after that. This view was also substantiated by 
Indian historians like V. N. Datta and Raja Ram, who see O’Dwyer’s harsh rule as a direct cause 
of the Punjab disturbances in 1919.72 Raja Ram goes even further in stating that this was a 
premeditated plan by the British under O’Dwyer’s supervision in Punjab. However, many British 
writers, most noticeably Colby, Swinson, and Bond, disregard this factor as seen in most authors, 
and newspaper articles published in Britain. In this, they follow the lead of the Majority Report 
of the Hunter Committee, which firmly stated that O’Dwyer’s recruitment campaign had no 
connection with disturbances.73 There were also other hardships outside human control, which 
contributed to the general state of discontent in Punjab. The worst outbreak of malaria since 1908 
hit the region in the autumn (Fall) of 1917. Simultaneously, Influenza ravaged the province 
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claiming a million lives, which will be discussed later in the paper. 
A significant number of reasons for discontent and confrontation within Punjab existed in 
1919, but most importantly, a fundamental change had occurred within Indian Politics. As Helen 
Fein stated, “Not until the second decade of the twentieth century was the British Raj challenged 
by a concerted drive for self-government on the part of the Indian political Elite.”74 The British 
response to the Rowlatt agitation signifies that they were unaware of the changed political 
atmosphere. Their use of force and repression instilled in the new political elite even more 
determination and gave all Indians a reason to unite against the Raj.75 
The satisfactory account of the incident can only be understood by looking at several 
different arguments made by people worldwide. Since this event attracted historians and authors 
from other parts of the world, it gives us a perspective that cannot be overly biased towards one 
nationality. Next, we will try to understand what caused the Massacre and was it one incident 
that happened quickly or was it a succession chain of events that led to it. 
Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent 
caused by the city’s many problems. The plight of Miss Sherwood is an incident particularly 
emphasized by imperialist writers. An attack on a woman was viewed as much more terrible than 
an assault on a man. She was also an upstanding citizen who in no way provoked her attackers. 
Her experience is often sensationalized to show how wild and lawless the crowd was. Swinson 
described the scene dramatically: “Somehow she managed to rise and ran on a little way, but the 
mob, howling and screeching like savages, returned to the attack.”76 This helps to build up to a 
justification of Dyer’s action. Miss Sherwood’s suffering can also be an explanation of Dyer’s 
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harshness, as noted by Draper. “The safety and protection of the women in the event of an 
explosion was drummed into him [Dyer] so well that it almost became an obsession.”77 Dyer was 
appalled by what had happened to Miss Sherwood and wanted to prevent any more similar 
occurrences. It could be that this concern helped him justify the shooting at the Jallianwala Bagh, 
in his mind, at least. 
British writers also tend to treat the event as singular, even those who attempt to justify 
the action, and therefore should see no reason to marginalize it. Arthur Swinson, however, 
realized that the massacre was, in a sense, inevitable. “What Amritsar exploded was the coy 
myth that one nation could govern another in a decent, civilized manner; it showed that sooner or 
later, domination led to barbarity.”78 Generally, though, British writers stuck to considering the 
event solely in relation to Dyer and the occurrence of April 1919, rather than as part of the 
imperial system.79 
Related to the disagreement over whether Dyer’s actions were singular or not is the 
debate over Dyer’s motives for ordering the shooting. Dyer himself seems to have been confused 
over the issue. In this report, he wrote to his superiors on April 14, and he stated, “I realized that 
my force was small and to hesitate might induce an attack. I immediately opened fire and 
dispersed the crowd.”80 This motive is substantiated by evidence in A Letter from India by 
Edward Thompson. After dining with Irving one evening, Thompson asked him what Dyer had 
said to him after the shooting. Irving replied casually that Dyer came to me all dazed and shaken 
up and said, “I never knew there was no way out.”81 He explained that when the crowd did not 
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scatter but held its ground, he thought it was massing to attack him, so he kept firing.82 
Dyer’s story, however, was not the same in front of the Hunter Committee. Then he 
claimed that “if they were coming to defy my authority after all I had done that morning, I had 
made up my mind that I would fire immediately to save the military situation.”83 Instead, the 
self-defense motive had disappeared, and General Dyer claimed that he had decided to take 
drastic action before arriving at the Bagh to produce a moral effect. Rupert Furneaux’s theory 
that Dyer’s judgment was damaged in the Jallianwala Bagh incident by arteriosclerosis, the 
condition which finally caused his death, depends on the belief that Dyer imagined that the 
crowd was about to attack him and his troops.84 He tries to account for the change in Dyer’s 
explanation of his motives by stating that the effect of the “hero” status, the passage of time, and 
belief that the later explanation was more valid made him change his story.85 Raja Ram, 
however, disregard the self-defense theory, which would make the whole incident the result of a 
misunderstanding, and believe that the shooting was planned and deliberate.86 The necessary 
acceptance of this motive makes the affair controversial: Dyer is either a hero who saved Punjab 
from rebellion or a figure of brutal repression. 
Raja Ram claims that Michael O’Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, thought out 
a stratagem consisting of two successive stages: to provoke the innocent masses to commit 
violence somehow, and then make that a pretext to pounce upon them and crush them through 
force.87 Though Raja Ram tries to prove the existence of this conspiracy theory, his argument is 
not very convincing as there are not many sources to support his argument. 
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The possibility of a plan put together by British officials was considered and investigated 
by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress. Still, the members of that 
committee could not find enough evidence to claim that a plot existed in their report. None of the 
Indian writers condoned the violence of April 10. But it also does not give the British writers an 
excuse to claim that European lives are valued more than the Indian lives as seen in Draper’s 
work.88 The circumstances surrounding the deaths of both nationalities were indeed different, but 
that does not disregard that Indian lives were taken. At the same time, they were in a non-violent 
protest, the protest happened because the British captured their leader. After killing twenty to 
thirty Indians, the rebellions were enraged and acted the same way the British acted with them in 
violence. 
Suppose no-one except Dyer was involved in the planning and motivation behind the 
incident. In that case, it can be considered as a one-off event carried out by one man and 
therefore marginalized. However, a piece of writing by George Orwell can be used to throw light 
on many of Dyer’s motives for carrying out the shooting and to show that it did stem from the 
widely held attitudes of the British in India. In “Shooting an Elephant” George Orwell recalls an 
incident that occurred while working as a sub-divisional police officer in Burma. The event he 
describes involves an elephant on the rampage, which he is expected to shoot. By the time 
Orwell arrives on the scene elephant has quietened down, so there is no real reason for it to be 
shot. Orwell states “every white man’s life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed 
at.”89 He also concludes that his primary motive for finally killing the elephant was “to avoid 
looking a fool.”90 In the British struggle to retain a superior pretense, and therefore paternal 
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(authoritarian) justification of India’s domination, saving face was fundamental. It was a primary 
concern for Dyer, as he showed in the evidence to the Hunter Committee. “I could disperse them 
for some time, then they would all come back and laugh at me, and I considered that I would be 
making myself a fool.”91 This may seem like a ridiculous reason for shooting hundreds of people 
but being laughed at was not a fear peculiar to Dyer. They were, in fact, commonplace among 
the British in India.92 
In front of the Hunter Committee, Dyer claimed that his actions were deliberate. “I had 
issued this proclamation, and it had shown that I tried to prevent them from meeting; therefore, 
when they disobeyed law and order, I shot.”93 Once again, Orwell can throw light on why Dyer 
chose this line of argument. “A sahib (someone who is considered elder/ a leader amongst 
everyone) has got to act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute, to know his mind, and do 
definite things.”94 The British in India could not afford to make mistakes; they had to appear in 
control at all times to maintain the face of authority. Perhaps Dyer realized the importance of 
these factors in preserving the British Empire and changing his story accordingly. The two 
incidents’ targets could not be more diverse — thousands of people in contrast to an elephant — 
but the reasons behind the shootings are very similar. This suggests that the values that caused 
Dyer’s actions were not unique. They seem to have been typical of the British in India. 
Therefore, the event cannot be written off as singular. 
Miles Irving, Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar District responded to this event on April 
18 by issuing a notice that stated “the government is sorry that some innocent persons were 
seduced by wicked people to go there and got killed. But everyone should bear in mind that 
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obedience to the order of the General Sahib (Sir) is obligatory, and the General Sahib will not, in 
future, put up with any kind of unrest.”95 It also stated that “false rumors have been going around 
and it is the duty if the Government that the real facts are known.”96 While there were people 
that had heard of this proclamation and thought it to be a scare tactic while some believed it and 
did not go. But, most of all did not know or hear any proclamation because it was not read 
everywhere. The Bagh had people coming from as far as Ramnagar which is more than 200 
kilometers (136 miles).97 
In the 1960s, sources focused on Gandhi (Ji)’s political philosophy and his teachings and 
a growth of non-alignment in the world affairs under Jawaharlal Nehru. The author W. H. 
Morris-Jones in his article “Mahatma Gandhi - Political Philosopher?” though he denies that he 
was not evaluating Gandhi (Ji)’s life and does not associate with his teachings, he does consider 
Gandhi (Ji)’s moral judgments and behaviors in South Africa and India. Morris focused on 
Gandhi (Ji)’s life after The Rowlatt Bills, followed by the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in 1919 
while emphasizing that he lived his life mostly under the Union Jack. He is mainly citing from 
the court hearing statements that Gandhi (Ji) had given in 1922 when he was sentenced to six 
years of imprisonment because of his sedition against the British government. This article 
critiques Gandhi (Ji)’s life and his political decisions heavily which helps us in understanding the 
political environment as he becomes the leader of Indian nationalist movement. 
Though the author does not favor the decisions, he acknowledges that these were few of 
the many choices made by Gandhi (Ji).98 The author questions Gandhi (Ji)’s use of the 
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Satyagraha movement and what that meant. Gandhi (Ji) used this movement to show that his 
fight is with the evil itself and not with evil-doer, in this case, the British Empire. While Morris-
Jones agrees that this was in benefit of the Indian Nationalist movement, he does not agree with 
it, stating that “One of the consequences of this view was Gandhi (Ji)’s insistence that the resister 
must always be willing to negotiate, for the end of non-violent struggle is always an agreement, 
never dictation, much less humiliation of the opponent.”99 While Nehru’s approach associated 
with the policy is explained in Damodaran’s article. Damodaran makes him a prophetic figure 
and yet focuses on the relationship between Nehru and Gandhi (Ji) to understand the moral basis 
of Indian Nationalism whereas Morris-Jones do not focus on the contribution of Nehru as much. 
Damodaran’s focus is not only to showcase that the Nehru-Gandhi relationship was strong, but to 
highlight the effects that Nehru’s movements had even though seeing some failures in overall 
political environment of the country. His view of their strengths as “The Gandhian contribution 
to this fascinating political experience was not only non-violence, but also morality and good 
faith; Nehru’s assets were information, sensitivity and awareness of the less well- known aspects 
of foreign policy issues, in other words, a certain breadth of vision, a magnitude of tolerance. 
Such a combination of attitudes finds it impossible to accept ideological differences as absolute 
and military confrontation as inevitable.”100 
Writing in the 1970s are focused on the events that happened in Amritsar before the 
Massacre. Authors were justifying in a way the nature of the crowd being peaceful. Though there 
is no mention of Raja Ram’s work suggesting the Empire’s planning nature, the pieces are 
written, indicating a chain of events that led to the Massacre. Helen Fein states that the “crowd 
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milled around the bridge,” which suggests a lack of organization or real direction on the crowd’s 
part.101 Fein, the American author, seem to agree with Indian views over the crowd’s nature. The 
opinion is backed up, to a certain extent, by an official document entitled Reports on the Punjab 
Disturbances, which states “the crowd passed several Europeans on the way (to the Hall Gate 
Bridge) but did not molest them.”102 This proves that between going to the bridge and leaving it, 
the crowd’s character changed and the most obvious explanation for this is the shooting.103 
Which explains the Dyer’s planned nature of the massacre as explored by Raja Ram in his work. 
During the 1980s, the topic was approached differently because of the economic reforms 
that were ushering in the country as Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister for her second 
term. The focus on Punjab became central because of the riots of 1984. Punjab has faced several 
problems under British rule with the Massacre being the biggest attraction. Then as the partition 
between India and Pakistan happened in 1947, it was Punjab that was divided and in turn created 
riots among the Sikh and the Muslims of India. The sentiment and the history behind the riots are 
explained in Cynthia’s article where she connects the contribution that Punjab has had in Indian 
Nationalism and the clashes with Indians politics.104 Ian Talbot’s book Punjab and The Raj, 
1849-1947, though, does not focus on the Amritsar Massacre but showcases the close 
relationship that the British had with their allies, especially India. His focus on Punjab 
(Sometimes written as Panajab in his work) helps understand why there were most soldiers in the 
Indian Army from this state. He focuses on the Unionist Party and the importance of local 
powerholders as collaborators with the Empire. He explores the provincial and communal 
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structure of Punjab and how it was formed. His detailed introduction about the state gives an 
insight into the massacres and independence movements and why Punjab became the earliest 
central hub for the beginning of the Indian National movement apart from Gandhi (Ji)’s rallies 
marches from Gujarat. The geographical representation provided in this book with the British’s 
arrival gives a great insight into the growth and the losses that Punjab had to endure under the 
Raj showcasing the importance of India as a colony. This is essential in understanding the 
importance of Punjab for the British in terms of military power. 
The 1990s brought a profound change in the discourse surrounding the Massacre. 
Beginning with Derek Sayer’s focus on the British reactions to the Massacre and how the 
perception of Amritsar’s singularity has dominated the English Historiography.105 Then Tuteja’s 
article describes and focuses on how Jallianwala Bagh became a critical juncture in the rise of 
Nationalism in India.106 Tuteja’s focus remains on the social phenomenon of the event when 
viewed as part of the larger historical process in Punjab. Besides the works on the Massacre, 
Tuteja also includes works that are not explicitly about the event but showcases how the 
Massacre became an important event in turning the Indian reaction towards the Empire. Like 
Narain, Tuteja focuses on Punjab’s rich history beginning from the East India Company’s 
annexation in 1849.107 Tuteja also addresses the idea that the Nationalist movement was weak in 
Punjab even after the Massacre, arguing that because “communitarian consciousness which had 
emerged in Punjab during the last three decades of the nineteenth century had a real potential for 
the evolution of a nationalist perspective which could manifest itself quite emphatically during 
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certain stages and phases of its development.”108 Narain’s book on the Historiography of the 
Massacre provides Hunter committee’s account in London and the Punjab Sub-Committee in 
India. She focuses on the different sides and their opinions. British, Indians, and authors’ 
reactions from Canada and America and their response to the Massacre.109 This book has been 
used as a source in most books in twenty – first century. This account explains in detail the 
position of Punjab before and after the Massacre. Narain also cites the debates that have been 
still going on in The House of Commons regarding the same.110 Though she is of dual heritage, 
British and Indian, she has tried to keep her biases aside and focus on other authors’ biases about 
the Massacre. Narain emphasizes a gap of five months between the official enquiry and the event 
itself, which has made the details obscure or forgotten.111 She also points out some of the works 
by the British authors condemn the Massacre, which is very unlike than the normal discourses 
due to cultural and national influence.112 Narain’s work being a historiography adds to the 
overall analysis done for this paper in pointing out different reactions to the massacre. The focus 
on the massacre provides a gap that is covered in this paper in form of people’s interviews. 
As the 100-year anniversary approached closer, the twenty and twenty-first-century work 
started to focus on the British Empire’s injustice and how there has been no official apology 
from the English government. These works focus on the primary sources written immediately 
after the Massacre and India and Britain’s committees. Nick Lloyd’s work The Amritsar 
Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day, starts addressing the massacre and its scenario. 
Lloyd’s works is one of the few that have looked at the Interview report of the Indian National 
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Congress Sub-Committee, Vol. II of 1920. He mentions the eyewitness accounts and what they 
saw after and during the massacre to support the argument about the nature of the event. His 
work contains very few of those accounts, from more than thousand interviews.113 The authors 
personal visit to the Jallianwala Bagh in 2007 makes it a notable account as his viewpoints 
become comparable to the history of that place.114 Lloyd reiterates what the authors in nineties 
have written about the massacre condemning General Dyer and his actions with the exception of 
Nigel Collett who wrote the first biography of Dyer since 1929. 
Collett though agreeing on the horrific act of Dyer supports his actions and showcases 
that he ordered the fire “not because he was callous or bloodthirsty,” but because he interpreted 
the violence in Amritsar and the gathering as a “challenge to his way of life and everything he 
stood for.”115 Lloyd’s claim that his book is the first comprehensive account of the disorders of 
1919 to be written is not unfounded as seen in the aforementioned works. He makes a valid point 
in saying that the background to the massacre was not one of the ruthless imperial control but 
was carried out in a situation where the British Raj was introducing a variety of reforms. This 
had increased the Indian participation as promised by the Montagu-Chelmsford reform and this 
places a greater emphasis on nationalism opinion.116 
Lloyd’s inclusion of the interviews is a great example of how the source is underutilized 
as he did not include some of the interviews that truly explain the horrific nature of the massacre. 
Like the account of a widow, Ratan Devi, showcases the horrors that people had to endure even 
after the massacre. Her testimony is one of the most heart wrenching narratives of the event and 
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the aftermath of it. Devi testified to having heard of the shooting while she was sitting in her 
house waiting for her husband who had gone to the Bagh. She instantly ran with two other 
women to help her. She saw heaps of bodies upon arriving at the Bagh and immediately started 
to search for her husband. After finding the dead body which was past a way full of blood and 
dead bodies, she asked other people to bring her a charpai (cot) to carry the body of her husband 
home. She also had sent the two women home to bring a cot but as it was already past 8 o’clock 
and no one could come out of the house because of the curfew order. She asked some other 
people who were looking for their sons’ body to help her move the body of her husband as it was 
drenched in blood to a drier place. She stayed near the body as she witnessed three other men 
writhing in agony, a buffalo struggling in pain, and a boy of about 12 years old in agony. The 
boy entreated her to not leave the place as he would be alone. The clock kept ringing every hour 
as the time passed and at around 2 o’clock a jat (People of agriculturally based community are 
called Jat) asked her to raise his leg as he was entangled in a wall while he was trying to escape. 
She returned to her husbands’ body after helping him. No one had come to their help until 6 a.m. 
then the people from her street had brought the cot and took her husbands’ body home while 
hiding from the police. She said that “It is impossible for me to describe what I felt. Heaps of 
dead bodies lay there, some on their back and some with their faces upturned. A number of them 
were poor innocent children. I passed my night, crying and watching. What I experienced is 
known to me and to God. I cannot say more” and that was the end of the interview.117 
The crowd’s initial nature and whether the shots fired were justified are matters of 
disagreement among historians. Some consider that the crowd was on the rampage even before 
any shots had been fired.  
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Alfred Draper describes the “mob” as “frenzied” and “half-crazed” before any of them 
were killed or injured.118 Arthur Swinson pictures the crowd with an “excited, rapt look in their 
eyes which is the prelude to murder.”119 Such descriptions that dramatize the event make the 
shooting seem necessary. The Hunter report takes a less definite line of argument, stating that 
the crowd was “excited and angry” but “had not as yet resolved on anything definite.”120 These 
interpretations suggest that the crowd was volatile but not murderous until after soldiers opened 
fire.121 The Congress Report portrays a different type of gathering: “it was a crowd of mourners - 
bareheaded, many unshod and all without sticks.”122  
Indian opinions agree with this report. They state that the actions of the British caused 
violence in the crowd. The only British writer to support this view is B. G. Horniman. He 
describes the gathering as “a wholly peaceful and not very large crowd of demonstrators.”123 
However, as most reports agree that the crowd consisted of tens of thousands, perhaps 
Horniman’s account cannot be considered entirely accurate at this point.124 As written in Woolf’s 
work about the Indian historians looking westward for models and methods in writing, they 
adopted both the disciplinary practices and the civilizing program of the British. This falls 
accurate into all the works that have been looked at for this historical analysis. Though it is about 
the change of how an event important in the Indian National movement is looked at and written 
about, it also falls under the umbrella that the Indian authors are participating in pro-imperialist 
writing. 
All the major works are written in English which is not the main language spoken in 
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India and yet they condemn the British for bringing in this cultural change in India.125 This work 
though falls under imperialistic writing, it does not associate with the Subaltern studies as 
suggested by Gayatri Spivak and Daniel Woolf in their writings.126 Spivak’s work adds value 
into the studies of subaltern and giving them voice, but she fails to provide the actual voices of 
the people. In her work she critiques the Imperialist writings and their understanding of the 
Indian culture from a western man’s perspective.127 It was a great attempt in giving voices to the 
people of India but without the people. This paper is about the massacre and its impact in the 
Indian Nationalist Movement and not about the retaliation of the Indians against British 
policies.128 In part it can be seen as the retaliation because of the agitation against Rowlatt Acts, 
but it was present because it was an unjust Act to suppress the Indians that they were no longer 
ready to tolerate. These works explain the form of writing that is supported by the twenty-first 
century authors in India and yet fails to note the importance of people’s lives lost in that event as 
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This chapter showcases the importance of the Rowlatt Acts and how this became a plan 
by the British Empire to oppress mainly people in Punjab and Indians in general. Jallianwala 
Bagh Massacre has been an important event in the history of Indian Nationalism. It focuses on 
the Rowlatt Acts and the series of events that led to the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, igniting the 
Indian Nationalist Movement’s fire. There is no clear indication whether the acts affected the 
people of Amritsar as the questions regarding it were not asked in the interviews by the Punjab 
Sub-Committee. It is also important to note that the Vol. II focuses on people that were affected 
by the massacre and hence that is more central to the argument.  
The Rowlatt Acts are important because they show the most impact on the following 
events and were condemned by the press and people worldwide in newspapers like The 
Manchester Guardian, The Scotsman, and The Christian Science Monitor in the form of protests 
in India. The combined force of Gandhi (Ji)’s non-violent Satyagraha, the people’s march, and 
The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre made the British realize their mistake and repealed the Act in 
1922.129 They are also important tom understand the massacre as one of the interviews that 
focused on the acts were of a High Court pleader aged 75, Lala Kanhya Lal Bhatia. According to 
his testimony he was supposed to give a lecture in the Jallianwala Garden without him being 
consulted. He called the proclamation false as no one had consulted him before giving out the 
information. He was compelled by the British to act as a special constable along with all the 
members of the local bar. The appointment for it was made on April 22, when there was no 
necessity for the maintenance of peace and order in the city. The police force was enough and as 
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a matter of fact, the city was quiet on those days. They were abused and were made to carry 
tables and chairs from one place to another. This added to their sufferings of the old age and the 
order was meant to punish the Bar. They were part of public affairs and took prominent part in 
the Rowlatt Agitation which made them a target by the British administration.130 
Authors like David Arnold, Durba Ghosh, and John F. Riddick talk about the acts in their 
works and suggest the direct impact these acts had on Indian Nationalism and Jallianwala Bagh 
Massacre.131 They offer that it was because of these acts that General Dyer ignored his junior 
officers’ requests to not fire and gave the order to open fire on a non-violent crowd. His 
subordinates knew that the crowd gathered there was not violent and celebrating the Baisakhi 
festival. Gandhi (Ji) also opposed these acts in his Satyagraha movement.132 
The British Raj undermined India’s contribution to the First World War as they passed 
such acts and policies. As stated by Vohra, “At the end of the war, the government, in an 
unbecoming hurry, passed the infamous Rowlatt Acts, which every Indian in the Imperial 
Legislative Council had voted against.”133 Whether the impulsive nature was intentional as they 
believed “plotting against the Empire” was getting stronger or because, if they took some more 
time to revise the acts, the agitation in Punjab and Satyagraha movements would crush the 
Rowlatt Acts is debatable. The Acts were “intended to crush subversive movements, these acts 
provided for stricter control of the press, arrests without warrants, indefinite detention without 
trial, and an in-camera trials of political prisoners, without juries. There is no clear indication of 
what the in-camera trials meant but reading the texts can be understood that the camera 
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represents a room. So, there would be no audience except the British officials, and the details of 
such trials would not be released to the public. 
The contribution of the First World War towards the victory did not make it a respectable 
colony but a burden of the poorer country. To the returning soldiers in Punjab, Jallianwala Bagh 
shattered the faith that the people had in the British sense of justice and fairness. To most native 
Indians, the unarmed massacre was a betrayal of the trust that they had placed on the British to 
rule them wisely, justly, and with fairness. In the average Indian’s eyes, the just, fair, and liberal 
Englishman suddenly turned into a ruthless, bloodthirsty tyrant who could not be trusted. On this 
sense of betrayal, Gandhi (Ji) built his mass movement, which put a premium on breaking the 
rulers’ laws. It proved a spectacular problem on how to carry the Indian people in support of the 
war efforts. For the Indian leaders, it proved equally a complicated problem on how to support 
the Government in its war objectives and fight for national aspirations.134 
Moreover, these acts denied the accused the right to know who his accusers were or to 
challenge the evidence on which he was being tried while requiring ex-political offenders to 
deposit securities and forbidding them to take part in any political, educational, or religious 
activity.”135 The British reasoning to pass these acts was unfounded, as explored in detail by the 
commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress in their 
report of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.136 The notable committee members included Mr. 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi as the Barrister-at-law, Hon’ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, 
as the ex-officio President of the Punjab sub-committee, and an additional member of the 
Imperial Legislative council. 
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The previous paragraphs clarify that the people of the Punjab were subjected to a variety 
of pinpricks by the local administration. It had made it well-nigh impossible for the people’s 
natural leaders -- the educated classes -- to control the populace by its studied contempt for them. 
It was in this atmosphere that the Rowlatt bills came upon the Punjab. It is common ground that 
when these two Bills were published, there was little or no revolutionary crime in India. Indeed, 
for years, it had ceased to affect any part of India other than Bengal and the Punjab. In Bengal, 
the party of violence came into being when content over the partition of Bengal the party of 
violence came into being when discontent over the partition of Bengal grew to white heat. In the 
Punjab, it was due to the Local Government’s various measures, which deeply dissatisfied the 
people. It became severe, owing to the gross ill-treatment of the proud Sikh settlers of Canada. 
They infected some local men, too, with their discontent, and the forcible interference with the 
returned immigrants: ex Komagata Maru, brought it to ahead.137 The causes of violence in each 
case were well defined and, in the opinion of the Punjab Sub-Committee, avoidable, and 
remediable. Any way violence both in the Punjab and in Bengal was brought under complete 
check, as the Government contends, under the powers taken by them in virtue of the Defence of 
India Act.138 
Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent 
caused by the city’s many problems. “This Act was passed as an emergency measure to cope 
with revolutionary outbreaks, that were feared during the war. It is possible to understand the use 
of such powers when all available fighting material had been removed from India to the 
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battlefields of France and Mesopotamia, and when India’s internal peace had to depend largely 
upon the loyalty and the peace-loving nature of the people.”139 The prominence of this agitation 
is explained by a journalist, Sardar Sardul Singh, who is also associated with some of the 
important political organizations of the province. He was also a member of the Provincial 
Congress Committee, Indian Association, Sikh League and other similar societies. He was at 
Lahore during the last disturbances as well as spoke at two of the meeting held to protest against 
the Rowlatt Bills when they were not passed into Acts. “It is very important to note here that 
nothing untoward happened on the day of April 6, because the authorities put their faith in the 
public leaders and gladly accepted their advice and cooperation.”140 He goes on to blame the 
“officials in their pin-prick behavior towards the people of the Punjab and had the police and the 
military not been brought in the city, as advised by the leaders (the British administration), no 
occasion would have arisen that day for such occurrence.”141 The people had been shot on some 
occasions before the massacre but nothing was that magnanimous and obnoxious.142 
The Act that raised a storm of opposition is the Section 42 that states “orders made under 
the Act shall not be called in question in any Court and “no suit or prosecution or other legal 
proceedings shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done under this Act. 
The powers given by the Act are to be cumulative and not in derogation of any other powers 
conferred upon the local Government.”143 The Government could use all means reasonable to 
them against any person or group and enforce compliance without any people’s questions. 
It has been contended on behalf of the Government that there have been 
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misrepresentations and exaggerations connected with the Act. We hold that the Act hardly lends 
itself to widespread misrepresentation. It has undoubtedly been misrepresented on the official 
side. A typical exaggeration that we have seen complained of is a cryptic phrase, “na appeal, na 
dalil, na vakeel,” meaning “no appeal, no argument, no pleader.” In our opinion, no self-
respecting person can tolerate what is an outrage upon society. The crime of Government 
became complete when they persisted in it in the face of unanimous widespread opposition. We 
would note, too, that the Viceroy has enough powers employing ordinances to deal with 
extraordinary situations. The Government was wholly unjustified in placing on the Statue book, 
on the eve of liberal reforms, an exceptional measure to deal with anarchy, as if lawlessness had 
been endemic instead of being rare in India.144 
A popular opinion as discussed in this chapter is seen in one of the testimonies by 
Hon’ble Rai Bahadur Raizada Bhagat Ram, a Barrister-at-law of the Punjab Legislative Council. 
“The people observed the hartal with the sole object of giving expression to their sense of 
humiliation and disappointment, due to the attitude adopted by the Government towards the 
people’s unanimous opinion with regard to the Rowlatt Act. There was absolutely no idea of any 
violence. The leaders in Jullundur then assured the local authorities that no breach of the law was 
at all in contemplation, and also of their readiness to cooperate with them to maintain “peace and 
order.” The authorities were further assured that no disturbance would take place, if the people 
were not gratuitously insulted, or otherwise provoked by the officiousness of the Police and their 
agents.”145 
The most prominent leaders of the Anti-Rowlatt movement in Amritsar were Dr. 
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Satyapal and Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew.146 Both men had been prohibited from speaking in 
public, but the Punjab government did not consider this restriction enough.147 On the evening of 
April 9, Irving received orders for the deportation of the two doctors. When questioned by the 
hunter committee, Sir Michael O’Dwyer justified this move with the precedent of the 
deportations of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh, which had quietened the disturbance of 
1907.148 However, in this case, the banishment of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal was a mistake, 
and many see the action as a direct cause of the Jallianwala Bagh shooting.149 
Dr. Safi-ud-din Kitchlew is a Muhammadan Barrister enjoying a considerable practice. 
He is a Doctor of Philosophy of Munster and a graduate of Cambridge. He was also a student at 
Aligarh. He is 35 years old, is married, and has got two children. He has been interested himself 
for several years in Hindu Muhammadan Unity.150 
Dr. Satyapal is a Hindu, Khatri by caste. He is a B. A., M. B. (Bachelor of Medicine, 
Bachelor of Surgery) of the Punjab University. He held the King’s Commission for one year at 
Aden during the War as Lt. I. M. S. (Indian Medical Service). He was a co-worker with Dr. 
Kitchlew and became famous because of having carried on a successful agitation against the 
stoppage of the issue of platform tickets to Indians at the Amritsar Railway Station. Both became 
much more popular during the Rowlatt agitation, and both approved of Satyagraha. There is no 
doubt that at Amritsar, as elsewhere, the Rowlatt agitation began to draw a much larger audience 
than before. As the agitation gathered force, by their continuous activity, they became the idols 
of the people.151 
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The situation was tense since the last week of March; large meetings were held, during 
which backing for the passive resistance grew. A hartal was held in Amritsar on March 30, even 
though Gandhi (Ji) postponed his plans for a national strike on that day as the news had not 
reached the city on time.152 Therefore, a second hartal was held in the town on April 6. On both 
days, the protest remained peaceful.153 The only antagonistic gesture noticed by the British 
authorities was a procession by a group of men dressed as Turks, which was taken to signify 
support for the Khilafat or Caliph.154 However, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Sir Miles 
Irving, still found the course of events disturbing despite the protest’s peaceful nature. On April 
8, he requested military reinforcements from the Punjab government in Lahore. On April 9, Ram 
Naumi day, his uneasiness increased.155 As a sign of Hindu-Muslim unity, not only Hindus but 
also Muslims were celebrating this Hindu Festival.156 A fantastic scene of fraternization 
occurred, including the sharing of water vessels, which is considered a breach of caste (because 
India was always believed to be a firm believer in caste systems among Hindus itself, but with 
Hindu and Muslim, it was marketed as a great sin, and such acts were looked at very cynically in 
society). Hindu’s have an understanding of the scriptures of different castes. In contrast, Muslims 
in India have a caste system that separates some people as “untouchables.”157 These two great 
religious groups did not get along because of their differences in social structure, food habits, 
and religious beliefs even though there are some similarities with fasting and pilgrimage.) 
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While the information provided in the secondary sources is easy to understand the 
chronology of events, but they do not justify the feelings that people had about Rowlatt Act. That 
can be found in one of the interviews of an Honorary Magistrate, Mian Feroz Din of Amritsar. 
When asked about whether he thought at all likely knowing the people of Amritsar and the 
circumstances that there was conspiracy? He replied that it was not at all likely as he has lived 
there for 60 years and know almost everybody by name in that area. He focuses on one point that 
“The people were certainly desirous of having the Rowlatt Act repealed, but there could not have 
been any conspiracy like what you (Interviewer) suggest.158 When asked about the Massacre and 
proclamation he said that “I heard later on from my son, that a proclamation was made in certain 
places in the city, prohibiting meetings or assemblies of any kind. I did not hear of any meeting 
at Jallianwala Bagh till the evening, when I was told in my house about it.”159 This confirms the 
rumor that British had said about the proclamation was heard by everyone while Indian authors 
emphasized on what Feroz Din had said. 
On April 10, at ten o’clock in the morning, Irving invited the two doctors to his 
bungalow. When they arrived, they were informed of the deportation orders and immediately 
sent to Dharamshala by car.160 News of their arrest spread quickly and coincided with Amritsar’s 
rumors that Gandhi (Ji) had been prohibited from entering Punjab.161 The people were outraged, 
and crowds began to gather, demanding the release of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew. A massive 
crowd — V. N. Datta claims that it numbered 50,000 — collected by the Hall Gate Bridge.162 
This bridge incorporated a footbridge and a carriage-bridge. The people wanted to cross the 
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bridges to the Civil Lines to go to the Deputy Commissioner’s Bungalow and appeal to him to 
release their leaders. In anticipation of trouble, however, the authorities had put a premeditated 
plan into action to defend the Civil Lines. Therefore, the crowd found itself stopped at the 
bridges by armed pickets. The mass of people began to push forward, and some threw stones at 
the soldiers. After a while, the pickets considered that it was necessary to shoot. In all, two 
volleys were fired, killing around twenty to thirty people.163 
As written in several books and articles cited in this paper, it was prominent that there 
was little or no revolutionary crime in India when the acts were passed. However, the Act was 
passed as an emergency to cope with the revolutionary outbreaks feared during the War. Such 
power is understandable when all available fighting material had been removed from India to 
France and Mesopotamia’s battlefields, and India’s internal peace depended upon the loyalty and 
peace-loving nature of the people. But, this Act was passed in March 1919, after the soldiers had 
returned home to India from the War.164 With an ongoing tension regarding the riots from the 
people of India, the British Raj enforced these Acts but were matched with an equal force of 
opposition by Gandhi (Ji)’s Satyagraha movement. Gandhi (Ji) seized this opportunity and made 
the bold decision of freeing himself from the role of recruiting sergeant and announced his 
opposition to the Rowlatt legislation. On February 24, 1919, he informed the Viceroy of his 
intention to resist this and other unjust laws. His call for a Satyagraha Pledge attracted a 
substantial number of people, mostly in Bombay and western India. Then, he decided to extend 
the protest on March 30 to an all-India Hartal.165This movement, though, was a success. There 
were reports of small violent outbreaks in many places, and that upset Gandhi (Ji). Right after the 
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protests, the massacre made him warier about starting any movements without previously 
establishing adequate organizational support. 
One such account of what the emotion was towards the Rowlatt Act is noted in the 
interview of Lala Hari Saran, owner of Donald Graham & Company and the resident of 
Amritsar. Being an owner of a shop, he was concerned about when they could open them without 
upsetting the government and insulting the Hartal. “On the 13th of April, as I was sitting at my 
house some people came and said that all the shops would open that day and there would be a 
meeting in Jallianwala Bagh, presided over by Lala Kanhya Lal, Pleader (his account is noted 
above). When I heard that the shops would open, I went to a friend and asked him to go with me 
to the Bagh, as the meeting must be about, the opening of shops. I heard not one word about the 
proclamation.166 Another testimony that suggest the lack of attention towards the proclamation 
by General Dyer. The following statement showcases the belief that people had in their 
Government that was the British Empire. “The speaker was saying that we should approach 
Government to release our leaders. He was not saying against Government. At that time an 
aeroplane (Airplane) passed over, and all the men got up, the lecturer said, “We need not fear 
anything. The Sarkar (meaning Government) is our father and mother: why should Government 
kill its own children?” Five minutes later a Doctor spoke, saying, “You must all pray to God that 
Rowlatt Act might be repealed and leaders might be released.” About 15 minutes after the 
aeroplane had passed over, the Gurkha troops came running in. Just as we were running away, 
they at once fired. Many were running at the time. An old man near me was shot in the head. I 
saw it was no use running and fell flat.”167 
The Punjab contributed sixty percent of the 1.3 million soldiers sent to fight the First 
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World War under the British Raj.168 Then, under Michael O’Dwyer’s administration, Punjab 
faced economic hardships when recruiting soldiers for the War. As the Lt. Governor of Punjab, 
he adopted a very hostile attitude towards the urban middle class. The economic hardships that 
the people in Punjab had suffered during the War also heightened their anti-colonial 
consciousness. The first significant issue of common concern was the steep rise in the prices of 
essential commodities in this Province. For instance, there was a 100% price rise in the case of 
food grains between 1917 and 1919, but the artisans and workers’ wages increased only by 20-25 
percent. It caused deep economic distress to the lower middle classes, artisans, workers, and 
other fixed-income groups living in the cities, particularly in Amritsar.169 This hardship, 
followed by the Rowlatt act and Satyagraha, made it even worse as Punjab was among the major 
cities where the Hartal on April 6 was very successful and attracted many crowds. Then, the 
massacre followed on April 13, which was the last spark that ignited the fire of Nationalism in 
India, and Gandhi (Ji) attacked the Raj in full force with his marches and rallies of non-violent 
movements.170 
This sparked a sense of betrayal amongst Punjab people since most people in the army 
came from there. The Massacre gave Gandhi (Ji) a tool to attack the British rule with his 
movements, and he soon became the Father of Indian Nationalism for India. The British called 
him the Father of Indian Unrest.171 
Some works suggest that the Massacre happened because of the non-violent movements 
conducted by Gandhi (Ji). These threats to the stability of the Empire became intolerable to the 
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British. “India waited after the war; resentful, rather aggressive, not very hopeful, but still 
expectant. Within a few months, the first fruits of the new British policy, so eagerly waited for, 
appeared in the shape of a proposal to pass special laws to control the revolutionary movement. 
Instead of more freedom, there was to be more repression. These bills were based on the report 
of a committee and were known as the Rowlatt Bills. But very soon, they were called the “Black 
Bills” all over the country, and were denounced everywhere and by every Indian, including even 
the most moderate. They gave great powers to the Government and the police to arrest, keep in 
prison without a trial, or to have a secret trial of any person they disapproved of or suspected.”172 
In a speech given by O’Dwyer on April 7 to the council before his intended departure. He 
cynically spoke about his recruitment and “achievements” in Punjab while saying on the 
expatiated inoffensive nature of the Rowlatt Act. He noted that it was not true that it conferred on 
the police no arbitrary arrest powers, search, or interference. Everyone who has read the Rowlatt 
Act knows that it does contain such powers and that it is because by the people. Sir Michael, 
however, was not satisfied with his fanciful description of the Rowlatt Act. He wanted to show 
what he felt about the great demonstration of April 6, which was semi-religious for thousands 
upon thousands because of the fast. He laughed at it in this manner: - “the recent 
puerile demonstrations against the Rowlatt Act in both Lahore and Amritsar would be ludicrous 
if they did not indicate, how easily the ignorant and the credulous people, not one in a thousand 
of whom knows anything of the measure, can be misled. Those who want only to mislead them 
incur a serious responsibility. I would remind them of President Lincoln’s saying, “you can, if 
you are very clever and very unscrupulous, mislead all people for some time and some people for 
all time, but you cannot mislead all people for all time. Those who appeal to ignorance rather 
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than to reason have a day of reckoning in store for them.”173 No other Head of Government in 
India laughed at the people on April 7. Everyone but Sir M. O’Dwyer realized more or less the 
meaning of the April 6. Still, Sir Michael’s one desire was to provide “a day of reckoning” for 
those, who he thought, were appealing to passion or ignorance rather than to reason.174 He goes 
on saying that those of you who have studied that law know-how baseless that agitation 
from what took place a few days ago at Multan, when the Rowlatt Bill agitation was made a 
pretext for offering an insult to gallant Punjabi Muhammadans, Sikhs and Goorkhas, that had 
returned from the front, after fighting the battles of India. These insultors had, as we know, 
no martial spirit themselves and no appreciation for the valor and loyalty of those who had been 
safeguarding their hearths and homes. Their object is to attack the Government and insult those 
who are true to their salt. Loyal men must and will oppose their evil designs. I would, therefore, 
ask you to explain the motives and policy of Government, as shown in that law, to those within 
your influence, and to expose the campaign of falsehood that is being carried on in certain 
quarters to mislead the ignorant and credulous masses and the scum of the bazars of the towns 
and to incite them to crime and disorder.175 
One of the main questions in the discussion between Gandhi (Ji), Montagu, Chelmsford, 
and Annie Besant were India’s self-government after the War.176 As the war was fought for 
democracy and its ideals, the British promised their colonies some self-rule aspect after the 
War.177 The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms took one of the main actions for the same. The 
secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, had proposed to gradually expand self-government 
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in India by increasing the numbers of Indians in every part of the administration. This idea was 
supported by the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford. He entailed that giving a greater 
representation to Indians in provincial assemblies would be beneficial. Montagu announced in 
August 1917 that the British Government desired “the gradual development of self-governing 
institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India, as an 
integral part of the British Empire.”178 Most Indians saw this as recognition and reward for the 
cooperation, money, and men their country had given towards the war effort. In the summer of 
1918, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were published. These much-anticipated moves were 
soon found to be very disappointing. Annie Besant voiced their general reception when she 
stated that they were “unworthy of Britain to offer or India to accept.”179 Around the same time, 
the findings of the Rowlatt Committee were published. Still, this generated resistance from the 
Indian Civil Service members and the provincial governors, notably Michael O’Dwyer. As 
governor of Punjab, he argued the reforms would encourage continued protests and rioting that 
had broken out in many provinces. He supported the Rowlatt Acts, and as they were passed, the 
hope that the Indians had towards the Empire vanished, and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were 
forgotten in the rage against the Rowlatt Act.180 
As described by Erez Manela in his work, when the British authorities, concerned with 
the growing agitation for home rule, moved to enact a series of Acts that extended the 
Government’s wartime powers of internment without trial.181 The acts were based on a 
committee report, submitted in July 1918, which would allow the Government to continue to 
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suppress “conspiracy and political outrage” once the war was over. The reports were made into 
law on March 21, 1919. The response to the acts must be understood in the context of the 
anticipation of far-reaching change that had built up among Indians during war years. Both the 
Indians and the British made the connection between the Wilsonian moment’s rhetoric and the 
Indian campaign against the Rowlatt Acts.182 As the All-India Congress Committee president 
wrote after the events at Amritsar, a complete understanding of Indian discontent and its causes 
must realize how “cheered and encouraged” Indians had been by Allied declarations the aims of 
the Great War were self-determination for all.183 Indians felt betrayed by the widespread 
opposition to the self-governance rule by the official and nonofficial British communities in 
India and abroad.184 
The tensions in India were increasing since the armistice. The British Empire’s promise 
about the self-governance was seeming to be a lie. Michael O’Dwyer’s recruiting methods had 
put an economic strain in Punjab, which had upset people. The most significant blow was the 
massacre of the thousands of innocent people gathered at the Bagh on April 13, 1919, during the 
Baisakhi festival. This resulted from the Rowlatt acts as the British were agitated by the 
misinformation that people are in a revolutionary mindset. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
were a light of hope in the darkness of death and oppression, but that didn’t matter as the Rowlatt 
Acts were passed as most British administrators wanted to put Indians in the oppressed state 
rather than what Montagu and Chelmsford were proposing. There is no indication in the readings 
whether Montagu-Chelmsford opposed the Act, but the impact that the Act had was that this 
gave the British the freedom to prosecute anyone they wish without the trial. The Acts were the 
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opposite of what the Indians had hoped for. The administrators like Madan Mohan Lal, Gandhi 
(Ji), and Jawaharlal Nehru with the Indian people were disappointed and agitated that they did 
not receive the promised self-governance. Instead, their families were massacred, and they were 
forced to go to prison for crimes that were not committed. The Indians, in exchange for their 
contribution to the First World War and in keeping the peace during the war era, received the 
Rowlatt Act and Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. 
From a military viewpoint, if there is a protest that turns violent, then the police could 
disperse the Indians with lathi charge (beating with wooden batons) or use any means to disperse 
the crowd. But if the protest is non- violent, then any measures that the British take to disperse 
would be considered extreme, further supporting Independence from the oppressor British Raj. 
In Dyer’s eyes, he saw fit to fire upon a crowd even after they dispersed to make an example that 
would be remembered, but he forgot that his proclamation did not also reach all the parts of 
Amritsar city. His expectancy that the neighboring villages would hear his announcement is 
unfair and misjudged. This shows that General Dyer wanted to present the obedience and 
morality question by massacring thousands of innocent people gathered in a place to celebrate a 
festival they have celebrated every year without the knowledge of any proclamation was only in 
the head of General Dyer. He slaughtered them by order of O’Dwyer, his superior. This event 
can be considered as the fire that started the domino effect of events, starting from the beginning 
of 1919; then, the Indian Independence was the snowball effect of the Massacre. The sense of 
betrayal and the price of loyalty paid in the Massacre by a British general was the spark needed 
for Gandhiji to make it into a wildfire of nationality brought in the Home-Rule in India. She got 




General Dyer related to the Indians as he was born in India and did his schooling there. 
He later joined the ranks in the Bengal army that became part of the British army. He served with 
the Punjabi’s and the Bengali’s together. This connection made him a “perceived” friend in the 
Indian population’s eyes, especially in Amritsar, while he was posted there as general.185  
186 
On the morning of April 13, Brigadier-General Dyer, who had arrived at Amritsar on the 
night of the April 11, gave testimony that he had given the following proclamation on April 13, 
and it was read aloud in Urdu in few parts of town which stated that it is hereby proclaimed to all 
that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to leave the city in his own private or 
hired conveyance or on foot, without a pass from the higher level officers. These included The 
Deputy Commissioner, The Superintendent of Police, The Deputy Superintendent of Police, The 
Assistant Commissioner, some notable Magistrates, and the Police Officer in charge of the City 
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Kotwali. No person residing in the Amritsar City is permitted to leave his house after 8 p.m. and 
if found in the streets after 8 p.m. are “liable to be shot.” No procession of any kind is permitted 
to parade the streets in the city or any part of the city or outside of it at any time. Any such 
processions or any gathering of 4 men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly 
and “dispersed by force of arms.”187 
“This proclamation was read out with troops led by the Brigadier-General 
personally, who left his quarters about 9 a.m. for this purpose and returned to them about 
1.30 p.m. about an hour before his return quarters in Ram Bagh. It is said that many 
people on hearing this proclamation read did not treat it seriously, but that remarks were 
made that it was bluff, that the General would not fire and not to be afraid.”188 
Brigadier-General Dyer had heard that, despite his proclamation, residents and 
neighboring villagers intended to hold a large meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh at 4.30 p.m., that 
afternoon. At 4:00 p.m., he received a message that a crowd of about 1,000 had already 
assembled there. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Brigadier-General Dyer marched from the Ram Bagh 
with picketing parties (as he had previously determined to picket the city’s main gates). With a 
special party consisting of 50 Indian Infantry armed with rifles, 40 Indian Infantry armed only 
with “Kukris” (short swords), and two armored cars. He proceeded straight to the Jallianwala 
Bagh, dropping his picketing parties en route. On arrival, he marched his infantry through a 
narrow lane into the Bagh, which is the town square and a place where the Baisakhi festival is 
celebrated every year and deployed them immediately to the right and left of the entrance. He 
left the armored cars outside, as the lane was too narrow to admit them. 
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Having deployed his troops, Brigadier-General Dyer at once gave orders to open fire and 
continued a controlled fire on the dense crowd facing him in the enclosure (which he estimated at 
5,000 persons) for some ten minutes, until his ammunition supply was at the point of exhaustion. 
One thousand six hundred fifty rounds of .303 Mark VI. Ammunitions were fired. The fatal 
casualties resulting from this auction are believed to be 379; the number of wounded has not 
been precisely ascertained but is estimated by Lord Hunter’s Committee at possibly three times 
the number of deaths. “The Evening of April 13, when the people gathered in Jallianwala Bagh 
for the Baisakhi festival, Dyer arrived there with his troops and opening fire to the crowd of 
20,000 and firing 1,650 shots. Most of the dead bodies were collected on the morning of April 
14, and the people of Amritsar were told to bury or cremate them quietly. No attempt was made 
by the authorities to count the number of those killed, so there is no general agreement. Dyer had 
issued a curfew order, and nobody wanted to go out to help the wounded on the 13th.”189 
190 
 
189 Narain, The Historiography of The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 31. 
190 Narain, The Historiography of The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. 
58 
 
This sparked a sense of betrayal amongst Punjab people since most people in the army 
came from there. The Massacre gave Gandhi (Ji) a tool to attack the British rule with his 
movements, and he soon became the Father of Indian Nationalism for India. The British called 
him the Father of Indian Unrest.191 
These bills were opposed by Gandhi (Ji)’s non-violent movements in the form of 
Satyagraha. The statements taken from the people by the Punjab Congress Committee shows the 
unfair treatment by the British. These are the eye-witness accounts of Amritsar, Lahore, 
Gujranwala, and surrounding places from April 10, 1919, until the event and the area’s residents. 
“I say the firing was unjustifiable. The Deputy Commissioner himself was present when the fire 
was opened… after the first few shots, the crowd rushed back, but the firing was continued even 
after they began running away…I witnessed many pathetic scenes and some gruesome sights. I 
heard a dying man gasping “Hindu Musalman ki Jai.”192 “When the soldiers had left the place, I 
came out of my hiding place and ran back to my house. I came to know that my son, Madan 
Mohan, was not in the house, and, as in the evening, he used to play near the above mentioned 
Bagh…Then somebody told me that the corpse of my son was lying in the Bagh. Accompanied 
by my relatives, I hurried up to the Bagh, where I found his corpse among hundreds of 
others.”193  
This agitated the people in India as the news started to spread about the Massacre. A 
statement from Dr. Satyapal, a political leader and a physician in Punjab, shows how this event 
was nothing but a failed attempt to suppress the Indian crowd. “Another point to which I wish to 
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allude is that the idea of a rebellion is chimerical, an apparition without a reality. People had no 
mind to rebel…the Government had withdrawn the Police and Military from the city on the 10th, 
and the city was, as stated by the officials, in the hands of the city people, and yet not a single 
case of mischief happened… “Rebellion” existed only in the brains of officials imbued with 
bitter feelings against the people.”194 
The people of the Punjab were incensed against Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s administration 
because of his studied contempt and distrust of the educated classes, and because of the cruel and 
compulsory methods, adopted during the war, for obtaining recruits and monetary contributions 
and by his suppression of public opinion by gagging the local press and shutting out the 
nationalist newspaper from outside the Punjab. The Rowlatt agitation disturbed the public mind 
and shook public confidence in the Government’s goodwill; this was shared by the Punjab in a 
fuller measure, perhaps than elsewhere…The arrest and internment of Mr. Gandhi and the arrests 
and deportations of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were unjustifiable and were the only direct cause 
of widespread hysterical excitement.195 
According to the Hunter committee, the disorders that started from the beginning of 1919 
led to the Massacre, whereas Independence for India began from here. In the British’s eyes, this 
event was the final nail in the series of events that came before it. For the Indian soldiers that 
returned from a war fought against oppression, and for the people who knew about the war, this 
was the hypocrite Empire that massacred thousands of innocent non-violent people, which 
sparked a sense of Nationalism and a weapon for Gandhiji to fight against the British Raj. “For 
four years and more, the resources of India, like those of the other members of the British 
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Empire, had been strained to the utmost in the prosecution of the war. A large effective army had 
been supplied, the Punjab itself making a substantial contribution of 400,000. India has raised 
three war loans and contributed £100,000,000 as its quota to the Empire’s war expenses. Besides 
the direct contributions in men and money, there were indirect contributions of a substantial 
character in various ways.”196  
Following is an excerpt from The Hunter Committee that was placed to judge the crimes 
of General Dyer. The Hunter Committee, Lahore, November 19, 1919: General Dyer is sitting 
under a Union Jack hung on the wall, in a large courtroom, facing a panel of Commissioners: 
Lord Hunter, Mr. Justice Rankin, General Barrow, a British civil servant, and an Indian barrister. 
Behind Dyer, who looks somewhat detached, there is a small audience of British officers. Sitting 
behind the long cable filled with legal documents, Justice Rankin asks the first question: 
“General Dyer, is it correct that you ordered your troops to fire at the thickest part of the crowd?” 
General Dyer staring woodenly at the panel, confirming, with the slightest nod of his head: “That 
is so.” Slightly taken aback by the attitude, the mild-mannered Rankin rubs his hands and reads 
out from his notes: “One thousand five hundred and sixteen casualties with one thousand six 
hundred and fifty bullets?” General Dyer replies with conviction: “My intention was to inflict a 
lesson that would have an impact throughout all India.” A small murmur arises from the officers 
behind the General, who nod in approval. Rankin looks at Dyer with a degree of disbelief, but 
the General’s expression reveals no emotion whatsoever. The Indian barrister asks the next 
question: “General, had you been able to take in the armoured car, would you have opened fire 
with the machine gun?” Dyer responds after a slight pause, “I think, probably - yes.” The 
barrister stares at the General for a moment, then simply lowers his eyes. For the first time, the 
 
196 William Hunter, Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 151. 
61 
 
presiding judge, Hunter, now addresses Dyer: “General, did you realize there were children - and 
women - in the crowd?” “I did,” Dyer responds, without a hint of regret. Rankin intercedes: “But 
that was irrelevant to the point you were making?” Dyer seems almost pleased that someone 
understood his reasoning: “That is correct.” There is an awkward silence before Rankin picks up 
the questioning once more: “Could I ask you what provisions you made for the wounded?” 
Clearly stumped, Dyer replies after a moment: “I was ready to help any who applied.” Baffled by 
what he was hearing, Rankin asks rhetorically: “General how does a child shot with a .303 Lee-
Enfield apply for help?” For the first time, Dyer seems uncertain of himself.197 
The idea of Nationalism has been present in the minds of Indian princely states and the 
undivided India. Some authors have written about the start of the Independence movement after 
1857, but if that is the case then India would have gotten her freedom earlier. According to 
Samuel Martin Burke in his book the British Raj in India, in 1857 there was no Indian nation and 
consequently no country-wide feeling of Nationalism. The recipients of western education, who 
later became the standard-bearers of Indian Nationalism, were, at this stage, tiny in number, 
without an organization of their own to give them weight, and too full of admiration for the 
blessings of British rule to oppose it.198 
From that point forward – a nationalist movement simmered led by mostly Gandhi (ji) at 
the beginning and then joined by the social revolutionists like Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdev 
and the trio popularly known as Lal-Bal-Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai of Punjab, Bal Gangadhar Tilak of 
Bombay, and Bipin Chandra Pal of Bengal, changed the political discourse of the Indian 
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independence movement.199 “It was an important and momentous moment in the history of 
India’s struggle for freedom. With Gandhi(ji) came new technique and new orientation of spirit. 
His emergence as a leader was felicitated by the circumstances of the day. It was the 
revolutionary situation in India caused by the Montague Declaration, Home Rule Movement, 
spread of plague and influenza resulting in the death of millions of people, forcible recruitment 
of Indians in the army, Rowlatt Act, Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, and the Khilafat agitation which 
necessitated a man, having the trust of his people in him. In 1920 a union was made between 
Khilafat leaders and the Indian National Congress, the principal political party and trailblazer of 
the nationalist movement. Mahatma Gandhi and the Khilafat leaders promised to work and fight 
together for the causes of Khilafat and Swaraj. Seeking to increase pressure on the British, the 
Califates became a major part of the Non-cooperation movement — a nationwide campaign of 
mass, peaceful civil disobedience. The support of the Califates helped Gandhi and the Congress 
ensured Hindu-Muslim unity during the struggle.”200 
While looking at the nationalist identity and/or sentiment after the Massacre the 
testimony of S. M. Habib, who was the editor of Daily Siyasat paper in Gujrat. “In the course of 
my journalistic experience, I have found that it is almost impossible for an independent journal to 
exist in the Punjab. Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s Government prohibited the circulation of newspapers 
published inside the Panjab, if they dealt with the methods of recruiting. Again, the nationalist 
papers, such as the “Amrit Bazar Patrika,” were also stopped.”201 The nitpicking by British 
administration can be seen here when Habib reports that “During the February of 1919, I 
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advertised the issues of a new daily the “Siyasat” at Lahore. It was advertised that it would 
advocate Satyagraha. Thereupon, the security of the press which published the paper was 
enhanced from Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000. Later, before any issue of the paper was published, the 
security was illegally enhanced to Rs. 2,000. The paper is being issued subject to 
precensorship.”202 
The prices of life necessities and other commodities of daily use increased immensely 
due to the war, pressing very heavily on the middle classes and people of limited means.203 
While the war was on, all the restraints and hardships, though felt bitter, were suffered patiently, 
because of the common purpose of winning the war. But the people generally had hoped that 
Germany’s defeat and the successful ending of the battle for the Allies would immediately end 
the abnormal conditions and bring into existence a happy and prosperous era. After the armistice 
was concluded in November 1918, the prevailing abnormal conditions, instead of vanishing, 
became aggravated, particularly concerning high prices. The ordinary people naturally became 
dissatisfied with their lot. There was widespread famine in the country due to the monsoon’s 
failure of the monsoon of 1918, and the prevalence of influenza and other epidemics had resulted 
in very heavy mortality… As already observed, the Punjab had supplied the most significant 
number of combatants by far than the other provinces in India. It is quite natural that due to 
casualties amongst them, war-weariness would be more pronounced in the Punjab than in any 
other region… On January 18, 1919, what is popularly known as the Rowlatt Bills were 
published and were introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council on February 6, 1919. The bills 
evoked almost universal opposition in the country. 
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They were opposed by almost all the Indian members of the Imperial Legislative Council, 
under the leadership of Vithalbhai Patel of all shades of political opinion in the country. In India, 
it was felt that, when she stood steadfastly by the Empire in the war and had thereby proved her 
right to be treated as an equal member of the Empire, this character’s repressive legislation was 
hurriedly passed. In contrast, the reforms scheme for the installment of Self-Government had not 
till then materialized.204 “While the bill was still before the Legislative Council, Mr. Gandhi 
joined the agitation against the bills, which thereby received a great accession of strength… On 
the evidence before us, we are of the opinion that there was no rebellion in the sense we have 
mentioned nor any organization for that purpose; further that there was no organization even for 
bringing about the disturbances and the atrocities which were committed by the mobs seized by 
the frenzy of the moment.”205 
From a military viewpoint, if there is a protest that turns violent, then the police could 
disperse the Indians with lathi charge (beating with wooden batons) or use any means to disperse 
the crowd. But if the protest is non- violent, then any measures that the British take to disperse 
would be considered extreme, further supporting Independence from the oppressor British Raj. 
In Dyer’s eyes, he saw fit to fire upon a crowd even after they dispersed to make an example that 
would be remembered, but he forgot that his proclamation did not also reach all the parts of 
Amritsar city. His expectancy that the neighboring villages would hear his announcement is 
unfair and misjudged. This shows that General Dyer wanted to present the obedience and 
morality question by massacring thousands of innocent people gathered in a place to celebrate a 
festival they have celebrated every year without the knowledge of any proclamation was only in 
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the head of General Dyer. He slaughtered them by order of O’Dwyer, his superior. This event 
can be considered as the fire that started the domino effect of events, starting from the beginning 
of 1919; then, the Indian Independence was the snowball effect of the Massacre. The sense of 
betrayal and the price of loyalty paid in the Massacre by a British general was the spark needed 
for Gandhiji to make it into a wildfire of nationality brought in the Home-Rule in India. She got 
that Independence in 1947. 
The national movement was not limited to men and politics, women also had a huge role 
in moving this movement forward as the killings of women and children in the massacre 
resonated with British women too. Antoinette Burton is one of the many names in history that 
helped shape the identity for women in the First World War and after the massacre. In her work 
Burdens of History, she writes about the British feminists and their representation of themselves 
by the way in which they represented an Indian female Other; their construction of an Orientalist 
“sister” became critical to a feminist agenda. Just as British feminists asserted a role for women 
in the public sphere at home, to aid the poor and needy, so the images they projected of an 
oppressed colonial womanhood forged a feminist imperial burden that necessitated a 
parliamentary vote for British women at home.206 
The idea of combining cultural identities and national identities into on unified movement 
was something that did not resonate with people pre-First World War, there was a disturbance in 
1857 with the mutiny of the Sepoy’s but that was shut down. Was it shut down completely or not 
could be argued and researched in a further paper but with the readings and the publications it 
can be understood that it was not forgotten. The people of India were longing for freedom from 
 
206 Dorothy O. Helly, Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915 by 
Antoinette Burton, The American Historical Review, 101, No. 2 (Apr. 1996): 492. 
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the British Raj and fighting for the freedom of other countries from the Nazi Germany put that 
point in the forefront and the massacre ignited the fire that was already presented among the 
soldiers in Punjab and the Sepoys of New Delhi 
The Jallianwala Bagh massacre changed the view of Indian people towards the British 
forever. It sparked a sense of Nationalism that was not seen before amongst the Hindus and the 
Muslims together. The historic and one of a kind Gandhi’s knowledge of law and understanding 
of the English language helped him combat the British in their own game.207 The returning 
soldiers of the First World War in Punjab felt betrayed, and on the other hand, the Hindus and 
Muslims joined hands together to overthrow their oppressors. While there was a focus on non-
violent movements from Gandhi’s supporters (Ji), some revolutionaries wanted an eye for an eye 
because of the families killed in the Massacre. It can be argued whether which method was more 
successful vs. productive, but the result, as seen, is that India got her freedom, and the Empire 
was forever weakened. This paper’s focus on the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre as the beginning of 
the rise of Nationalism in India proves that even though there were several rallies, marches, and 
movements against the British rule. Nothing impacted more than seeing the families and loved 
ones of the returning First World War soldiers massacred in a festival gathering. This showed the 
impact that, even with over a million soldiers’ contribution was not enough for the British to see 
that India was a colony that had more to give. Still, if poorly treated, the same province becomes 
the reason for the downfall of an Empire where the sun never sets.208 
 
 
207 Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners, 36-40. 






To understand what caused the massacre and was it one incident that happened quickly or 
was it a succession chain of events that led to it, I looked at the chronological events that took 
place in India. The undervalued source was also utilized to an extent where this paper does not 
become a monograph. Beginning at the return of soldiers from Egypt, France, and Gallipoli. 
Then, the Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent 
caused by the city’s many problems. In the last week of March, large meetings were held, during 
which backing for the passive resistance grew. A hartal was held in Amritsar on March 30, 
1919, even though Gandhi (Ji) postponed his plans for a national strike on that day as the news 
did not reach the city on time. Therefore, a second hartal was held in the town on April 6. On 
both days, the protest remained peaceful. The only antagonistic gesture noticed by the British 
authorities was a procession by a group of men dressed as Turks, which was taken to signify 
support for the Khilafat.209 However, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Sir Miles Irving, 
still found the course of events disturbing, and on April 8, he requested military reinforcements 
from the Punjab government in Lahore. 
This information is parallel to what Sardar Sant Singh, B.A., L. L. B., Vakil, High Court 
of Lyallpur had said in his interview.210 His account is another example of the brutality that the 
Indian people had to endure, regardless of their age. He covers the incidents starting from April 2 
and 3 until June 10 when the Martial Law ended. According to him the meeting that was held on 
 
209 The name given to the Muslim movement which supported the Caliph of Turkey, then the head of the Muslim 
faith. Britain had defeated Turkey in the war and Muslims were worried for the future of the Caliph. 
210 Bachelor of Arts – Bachelor of Legislative Law, and Vakil meaning Judge. 
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either April 2 or 3 was called to consider the advisability of publishing the message of Mahatma 
Gandhi and of holding a mass meeting of the citizens of the town. When asking the Deputy 
Commissioner of Lyallpur permission to hold public meetings on April 5 and 6 he was given 
permission with a written warning that “no procession would be permitted, no inflammatory 
speeches to be made in the meetings transgressing the limits of war, and no shop-keepers should 
be coerced, or undue pressure brought upon them to suspend their business.”211 Everything went 
smoothly until the April, 10. On April 11 as the news of the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi started 
spreading, followed by the confirmation by newspapers on April, 12 and the arrest of Dr. 
Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew disturbed the public mind. The Massacre on April 13 and firing on the 
crowd on April 14 created an excitement in town that was not seen before.212 At that moment 
people wanted revenge and fast, their intentions were not to have a national identity separate 
from the British, but it can be considered Nationalist movement from an Imperial perspective of 
the twenty first century. Sant Singh’s interview continues to explain the events as they were after 
the Massacre and during the Martial Law. The sentiments that people had was considered as 
disturbances by British administrators and several people were jailed during that time, some as 
little as 12 years old kids.213 To add to all the suffering people were made to pay the Imperial 
War Relief Fund which was Ten Rupees per square of land owned.214 
On April 9, Ram Naumi day, his uneasiness increased.215 As a sign of Hindu-Muslim 
unity, not only Hindus but also Muslims were celebrating this Hindu festival. Fantastic scene of 
fraternization occurred, including the sharing of water vessels, which is considered a breach of 
 
211 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 635. 
212 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 635-7. 
213 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 637-8. 
214 Santanam, Report of the Commissioners, 649. 
215 Ram Naumi, the day on which Hindus celebrate the birth of Ram, a deity widely worshipped in India. 
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caste (because India was always believed to be a firm believer in caste systems among Hindus 
itself, but with Hindu and Muslim, it was marketed as a great sin and such acts were looked at 
very cynically in society.) The most prominent leaders of the Anti-Rowlatt movement in 
Amritsar were Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew.216 Both men had been prohibited from 
speaking in public, but the Punjab government did not consider this restriction enough.217 On the 
evening of April 9, Irving received orders for the deportation of the two doctors. When 
questioned by the hunter committee, Sir Michael O’Dwyer justified this move with a precedent 
of the deportations of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh, which had quietened the disturbance of 1907.218 
However, in this case, the banishment of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal was a mistake, and many 
see the action as a direct cause of the Jallianwala Bagh shooting.  
On April 10, at Ten O’clock in the morning, Irving invited the two doctors to his 
bungalow. When they arrived, they were informed of the deportation orders and immediately 
sent to Dharamshala219 by car. News of their arrest spread quickly and coincided with Amritsar’s 
rumors that Gandhi (Ji) had been prohibited from entering Punjab.220 The people were outraged, 
and crowds began to gather, demanding the release of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew. A massive 
crowd collected by the Hall Gate Bridge. This bridge incorporated a footbridge and a carriage-
bridge. The people wanted to cross the bridges to the Civil Lines to go to the Deputy 
Commissioner’s Bungalow and appeal to him to release their leaders. In anticipation of trouble, 
however, the authorities had put a premeditated plan into action to defend the Civil Lines. 
 
216 Dr. Satyapal came from a middle-class Khatri family. Dr. Kitchlew was a Kashmiri Muslim. Together they were 
striving for Hindu-Muslim unity. 
217 Dr. Satyapal was prohibited from speaking in public on March 29, Dr. Kitchlew on April 4. 
218 Datta. New Light on the Punjab Disturbances in 1919, p. 129. This book contains Vols. VI and VII of the Hunter 
Committee Report, which were withheld from publication by Montagu at the request of Chelmsford. O’Dwyer’s 
evidence was included in these suppressed vols. 
219 A city in the Himachal Pradesh state of Now India, it was probably under the British control as seen in the map 
provided in Narain’s book. 
220 On 9 April Gandhi (ji) was stopped at Palwal station and escorted out of the Punjab. 
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Therefore, the crowd found itself stopped at the bridges by armed pickets. The mass of people 
began to push forward, and some threw stones at the soldiers.221  
On the evening of April 13, when the people gathered in Jallianwala Bagh for the 
Baisakhi festival, Dyer arrived there with his troops and opening fire to the crowd of 20,000 and 
firing 1,650 shots.222 Most of the dead bodies were collected on the morning of April 14, and the 
people of Amritsar were told to bury or cremate them quietly. No attempt was made by the 
authorities to count the number of those killed, so there is no general agreement on this matter. 
Dyer had issued a Curfew order, and nobody wanted to go out to help the wounded on the 13th.  
A Singular Event? British considered the massacre as a singular event, and Derek Sayer’s 
insight can be seen as enlightening, which states that this stems, I believe, from more than 
embarrassment in the face of one of the less glorious chapters in British history.223 The 
construction of the Amritsar Massacre from the start as “singular and sinister” marginalizes it. 
There has been no need to agonize over Amritsar as in any sense a national shame because it is 
aberrant, in a category by itself, not part of the national history at all.224 
As to the facts, there is no doubt and no dispute, and it is only necessary here to 
summarize them very briefly in their baldest form. On the morning of the April 13, Brigadier-
General Dyer, who had arrived at Amritsar on the night of the 11th, issued a proclamation 
forbidding inter alia processions to parade in or outside the city and declaring that “any such 
procession or gathering of four men will be “looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly 
and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary.” This proclamation was read out at various places 
 
221 There are no accurate figures of the number killed, indicating little administrative concern over the numbers of 
dead and injured. 
222 Disorders Inquiry Evidence, Vol III, 127. 
223 Swinson, Six Minutes to Sunset, 45. 
224 Sayer, British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre, 132. 
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in the city in the course of progress through the streets of a column of troops led by the 
Brigadier-General personally, who left his quarters about 9 a.m. for this purpose and returned to 
them about 1.30 p.m. about an hour before his return quarters in Ram Bagh, Brigadier-General 
Dyer had heard that, despite his proclamation, it was intended to hold a large meeting at the 
Jallianwala Bagh at 4.30 that afternoon. At 4 p.m., he received a message that a crowd of about 
1,000 had already assembled there. Shortly after 4 p.m., Brigadier-General Dyer marched from 
the Ram Bagh with picketing parties (as he had previously determined to picket the main gates of 
the city) and with a particular party consisting of 50 Indian Infantry armed with rifles, 40 Indian 
Infantry armed only with “Kukris” (short swords), and two armored cars. He proceeded straight 
to the Jallianwala Bagh, dropping his picketing parties en route. On arrival, he marched his 
infantry through a narrow lane into the Bagh and deployed them immediately to the right and left 
of the entrance. The armored cars were left outside, as the lane was too narrow to admit them. 
Having deployed his troops, Brigadier-General Dyer at once gave orders to open fire and 
continued a controlled fire on the dense crowd facing him in the enclosure (which he estimated at 
5,000 persons) for some ten minutes, until his ammunition supply was at the point of exhaustion. 
One thousand six hundred fifty rounds of .303 Mark VI. Ammunition was fired. The fatal 
casualties resulting from this action are believed to be 379; the number of wounded has not been 
precisely ascertained but is estimated by Lord Hunter’s Committee at possibly three times the 
number of deaths. 
General Dyer says, “I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed, and I consider 
this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect 
it was my duty to produce if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand, the 
casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely 
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dispersing the crowd, but one of producing an enough moral effect. From a military point of 
view, not only on those present but more especially throughout the Punjab. There could be no 
question of undue severity.” 
From this explanation, it is safe to say that it was not a question of whether this was a 
singular event. It was a question of insecurity and the Empire’s inability to keep a stronghold in 
India after Indian soldiers saw what the great war was about and the idea behind it. Yet, they 
suffered the same type of treatment at home. It was not just a massacre; it was the Empire’s show 
of desperation. This showcases that Indians felt betrayed by this incident, and that gave Gandhi 
(Ji) the tools and power to fight against the oppressors that were British Empire. 
The source that I wanted to shed some light on has been undervalued as shown in the 
chapter. As more people start to address this source and examine it closely it would give a better 
understanding in social history and Subaltern history. Looking at it from the lens of social 
historian it would bring about a change in dialogue that people felt about national identity and 
supporting Gandhi (Ji) for the same in the form of his Satyagraha movements or several marches 
after that until the independence in 1947. Meanwhile Subaltern studies is about the dialogue that 
the indigenous people say or write, and this is the perfect source for that. This source focuses on 











GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: INDIA 
Commissioner, The Sanitary. The Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India. 
Calcutta: Superintendent, Government Printing, n.d. 
Datta, Vishwa Nath. New Light on the Punjab Disturbances in 1919: Volumes VI and VII of 
Disorders Inquiry Committee Evidence. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1960. 
Disorders Inquiry Committee. “Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee 1919-20.” Calcutta: 
Government of India, 1920. 
Gandhi, Karamchand Mohandas to The Hon’ble Pandit Moti Lal Nehru. Selected Works of 
Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. IV. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Mudranalaya, 1920-28. 
Indian Disorders Committee. “Indian National Congress.” Disorders Report, 1-5, 1920. 
Indian National Congress, All India Congress Committee, Punjab Sub-Committee. 1976. Punjab 
disturbances, 1919-20. Investigation Report. New Delhi: Deep Publications. 
Indian National Congress. Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee 
of the Indian National Congress. Vol. I, Report. Lahore: K. Santanam, 1920. 
Indian National Congress. Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee 
of the Indian National Congress. Vol. II, Evidence. Lahore: K. Santanam, 1920. 
Indian National Congress, Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee 
of the Indian National Congress. Vol. III, Lahore: K. Santanam, 1920. 
74 
 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, “Congress Report on the Punjab Disorders.” New Delhi: 
Publications Division Government of India, Vol. 20, 1920. 
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS: UNITED KINGDOM 
“20th Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers.” House of Commons Hansard, 
Vol. 131, 1920. 
“21st Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers.” House of Commons Hansard, 
Vol. 366, 2001. 
Hunter, William. “Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-20 Appointed by the 
Government of India to Investigate Disturbances in Punjab, Delhi, and Bombay.” 
Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920. 
Official Report of Hansard Committee. “The Parliamentary Debates.” Debate, London, Vol. 1-5, 
1920. 
Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter’s Committee. “The Parliamentary Debates: 
Army Council and General Dyer.” Hansard Committee Debate, London, Vol. 131, July 
8, 1920. 
Official Report. “The Parliamentary Debates.” British Library, 5th series, Vol. 67, Col. 1695. 
“Statement to the Army Council.” Disturbances in the Punjab: Statement by Brig.-General R. E. 
H. Dyer. C. B. (cmd. 771). London, 1920. 
HISTORICAL NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 




“Admits Crime in Amritsar Riots: But Indian Commissioner Says Punishment Was “Calculated 
Inhumanity.” Full Report is Now Here. Framers Say Officials Should Be Impeached, But 
Merely Request their Dismissal. Can’t Ignore “Atrocious Injustice.” Causes Leading To 
The Riots.” The New York Times, June 13, 1920. 
“British Rule in India: Mr. Harwood, M.P., On Some of the Problems Population and Famine 
India and Self-Government the Religious Question.” The Manchester Guardian, 
February 24, 1908. 
Hossain, Syud. “What India Wants: Self Rule One Of Three Fundamental Demands In Case For 
Country Set Forth By Indian Leader Elements Of Situation. “Let Us Forgive And 
Forget.” The Punjab Wrong. What Was The Sequel? The Moslem Question. Question Of 
Allegiance. What India Wants Swaraj. Federal Republic.” The New York Times, April 9, 
1922. 
Merz, Charles. “Indian Noncooperation, Despite Negative Aspect, may Achieve Good if it 
Escapes Violence: Noncooperation Began as Result of Long Period of Growing Unrest 
Native Opponents Then Alone Gandhi Points to Cling to Attack on Two Problems. 
Loose-Kait Country. Movement, which Arose in 1920 After Amritsar Massacre, has 
Seven Planks Against which British Government and Many Natives, Says Merz, are 
Arrayed-it has Chief Hold among Masses and has Moved Authorities to Repression—
Fans Racial Hatred. New Sense of Aspirations.” The Washington Post, February 28, 
1922. 
“Pacifying Punjab by Martial Law: In Tracing Causes of Outbreaks, Authorities Said to Concede 
Rowlatt Crimes Act Has Been “Mere Stalking Horse” Causes of Revolt The Army or Jail 
Loaning Under Pressure in the Post Office Compound.” The Christian Science Monitor, 
76 
 
August 1919, p. 7. 
P.W. Wilson. “Two Englishmen on India: And Whether or Not British Rule is Doomed in The 
Orient.” The New York Times, April 12, 1925. 
“Repot of the Hunter Committee: General Dyer’s Conduct.” The Scotsman, May 27, 1920. 
“Rowlatt Acts: Government’s Position”. The Scotsman, April 1915, p. 5. 
Zimand, Savel. “Gradual Home Rule Expected For India: But British Wish To Control Its 
Progress -The New Swaraj Leader Home Rule of ‘Gradual’ Sort Is Now Expected For 
India.” The New York Times, August 9, 1925. 
PRE-INDEPENDENCE MONOGRAPHS AND PAMPHLET PUBLICATIONS 
Carthill, A. L. The Lost Dominion: The Story of England’s Abdication in India. Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1924. 
Lloyd, Nick. The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day. London: I. B. Tauris 
& Co. Ltd., 2011. 
Majumdar, Bimanbehari. “Nationalism in India in Pre-Congress Days.” The Indian Journal of 
Political Science 19 (1958): 142-147. 
Wilson, P.W. “India in 1923-24. A Statement for the British Parliament by L.F. Rushbrook 
Williams, All Souls’ College, Oxford: Director of Public Information, Government of 
Judia, 1925. 
POST-INDEPENDENCE MONOGRAPHS AND EDITED COLLECTIONS 




Arnold, David. Gandhi: Profiles in Power. London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001. 
Brendon, Piers. The Decline and Fall of The British Empire: 1781-1997. New York: Vintage 
Books, 2010. 
Bronstein, Jamie L. and Harris, Andrew T. Empire, State, and Society: Britain Since 1830. 
Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 
Burke, Samuel Martin and Quraishi, Salim Al – Din. The British Raj in India: An Historical 
Review. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Burton, Antoinette. The Trouble with Empire: Challenges to Modern British Imperialism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Cell, John W. Hailey: A Study in British Imperialism 1872-1969. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. 
Chandra, Bipan, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, K N Panikkar, and Sucheta Mahajan. 
India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947. Gurgaon:  Penguin Random House India 
Private Limited, 2016. 
Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
Coates, Tim. The Amritsar Massacre, 1919: General Dyer in the Punjab. Abridged Edition. 
United Kingdom: Stationery Office, 2000. 
Colvin, Ian Duncan. The Life of General Dyer. Chandigarh:Unistar Books, 2006. 




Cooper, Frederick, and Stoler, Ann Laura. Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois 
World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
Das, Santanu. Race, Empire and First World War Writing ed. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2011. 
Datta, Vishwa Nath. Jallianwala Bagh. Ludhiana: Pragati Publishers, 1969. 
David, Arnold. Gandhi: Profiles in Power. Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2001. 
Draper, Alfred. Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj. London: Cassell Ltd., 1981. 
Embree, Ainslee T. Problems in Asian Civilization - 1857 in India: Mutiny or War of 
Independence?. Boston: D. C. Heath Company, 1963. 
Fein, Helen. Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British 
Judgment, 1919-1920. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977. 
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: The Rise and Demise of The British World Order and The Lessons for 
Global Power. New York: Basic Books, 2004. 
Furneaux, Rupert. Massacre at Amritsar. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963. 
Gandhi, M. Karamchand. An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth. United 
Kingdom: Floating Press, 1940. 
Goswami, Manu. Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Guha, Ranajit and Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. Selected Subaltern Studies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988. 
Herman, Arthur. Gandhi & Churchill: The Epic Rivalry that Destroyed an Empire and Forged 
79 
 
Our Age. New York: Bantam Books, 2008. 
Hibbert, Christopher. The Great Mutiny: India 1857. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. 
Horniman, B. G. Amritsar and Our Duty to India. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1920. 
Irish, Major MSC Bell R. Amritsar Massacre: The Origins of the British Approach of Minimal 
Force on Public Order Operations. Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 
2009. 
James, Lawrence. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994. 
Judd, Denis. The Lion and The Tiger: The Rise and Fall of The British Raj. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
Kent, Susan Kingsley. Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918-1931. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Lewis, Martin Deming. Gandhi: Maker of Modern India? Boston: D. C. Heath, 1966. 
Lloyd, Nick. The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day. London: I. B. Tauris 
& Co. Ltd., 2011. 
Manela, Erez. The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
McLain, Robert. Gender and Violence in British India: The Road to Amritsar, 1914-1919. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Mitcham, John C. Race and Imperial Defence in The British World: 1870-1914. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016. 




Omissi, David. Indian Voices of The Great War: Soldier’s Letters 1914-1918. London: 
Macmillan Press, 1999. 
Osterhammel, Jürgen. The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth 
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. 
Palat, Raghu, and Palat Pushpa. The Case that Shook the Empire. New Delhi: Bloomsbury India, 
2019. 
Pati, Budheswar. India and the First World War. New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher and Distributors, 
1996. 
Porter, Bernard. The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Ram, Raja. The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A Premeditated Plan. Chandigarh: Panjab 
University Publication Bureau, 1969. 
Riddick, John F. The History of British India: A Chronology. London: Praeger Publishers, 2006. 
Roberts, J. M. The New History of The World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Smith, Tony. Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and its 
Crisis Today. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 
Swinson, Arthur. Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and the Amritsar Affair. 
United Kingdom: P. Davies, 1964. 
Talbot, Ian. Punjab and The Raj: 1849-1947. New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988. 
Thompson, Edward. A Letter from India. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1932. 
81 
 
Tombs, Robert. The English and Their History. New York: Vintage Books, 2014. 
Toye, Richard. Churchill’s Empire: The World that Made Him and The World He Made. New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1973. 
Venkatarangaiya, M. Nationalism in India. Waltair: Andhra University Press, 1971. 
Vohra, Ranbir. The Making of India: A Historical Survey. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. 
Wagner, Kim A. The Great Fear of 1857: Rumours, Conspiracies and the Making of the Indian 
Uprising. Oxfordshire: Peter Lang Oxford, 2010. 
Wagner, Kim A. Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear & The Making of a Massacre. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2019. 
Woolf, Daniel. A Concise History of History: Global Historiography from Antiquity to The 
Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
POST-INDEPENDENCE JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Basu, A. “Feminism and Nationalism in India, 1917-1947.” Journal of Women’s History 
(Indiana University Press) 7 (4): 95-107, 1995. 
Bond, Brian. “Amritsar 1919.” History Today 13 (1963): 668. 
British Library. “Indian Newspaper Reports, c 1868-1942.” From the British Library, London 
Marlborough: Adam Matthew Publication, 2005. 
Choudhury, Soumen Dhar. “An Impression of the Advent of Gandhi in Indian National 
Movement.” Social Science Research Network, (2019): 1-5. 
Collett, Nigel A. “The O’Dwyer v. Nair Libel Case of 1924: New Evidence Concerning Indian 
Attitudes and British Intelligence During the 1919 Punjab Disturbances.” Journal of the 
82 
 
Royal Asiatic Society 21, no. 4 (2011): 469-83. 
Damodaran, A. K. 1983. "Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-Alignment." Indian Quarterly 39 (1): 41-
49. 
Fogarty, Richard. “Race, Racism and Military Strategy.” British Library, 2014. 
Framke, Maria. “India’s Freedom and the League of Nations: Public Debates 1919–33.” Asia 
after Versailles: Asian Perspectives on the Paris Peace Conference and the Interwar 
Order, 1919-33, edited by Zachmann Urs Matthias. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, (2017): 124-43. 
Helly, Dorothy O. “Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture: 
1865-1915 by Antoinette Burton.” The American Historical Review vol. 101, no. 2, April 
1996. 
Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley. "Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order." Asian Survey 
(University of California Press) 29, no. 3 (March 1989): 326-340. 
Majumdar, Bimanbehari. “Nationalism in India in Pre-Congress Days.” The Indian Journal of 
Political Science 19 (1958): 142-147. 
Mitra, K. Subrata. “The Ambivalent Moderation of Hindu Nationalism in India.” Australian 
Journal of Political Science (Routledge) 48 (3): 269-285, 2013. 
Morris-Jones, W. H. "Mahatma Gandhi - Political Philosopher?" The Indian Journal of Political 
Science, 1960: 203-224. 
Safi, Michael. “Churchill’s Policies Contributed to 1943 Bengal Famine – Study” The Guardian: 
Guardian News and Media Limited, March 29, 2019. 
83 
 
Sayer, Derek. “British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre: 1919-1920.” Past and Present, Vol. 
10: 130-164, 1970. 
Seal, Anil. “Imperialism and Nationalism in India.” Modern Asian Studies 7 (3): 321-47, 1973. 
POST – INDEPENDENCE NEWSPAPERS 
Sherwood, Harriet. “Indians in the Trenches: Voices of Forgotten Army are Finally to be Heard.” 
The Guardian, October 27, 2018. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 
Brown, Judith M. “Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand [known as Mahatma Gandhi] (1869–1948), 
Political Leader and Religious and Social Reformer.” Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. September 23, 2004. 
Chauhan, Yamini. “Dominion: British Commonwealth.” Encyclopædia Britannica. December 7, 
2011. 
Madra, Amandeep Singh. “Singh, Udham (1899–1940), Assassin.” Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography. September 23, 2004. 
Moreman, T. R. “Dyer, Reginald Edward Harry (1864–1927), Army Officer.” Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography. September 23, 2004. 
Pallardy, Richard. “List of Prime Ministers of India.” Encyclopædia Britannica. October 3, 2014. 
Pletcher, Kenneth. “Home Rule League.” Encyclopædia Britannica. September 6, 2018. 
Sinha, Surabhi. “Rowlatt Acts.” Encyclopædia Britannica. January 26, 2014. 
Woods, Philip. “O’Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940), Administrator in India.” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography. September 23, 2004. 
WEBSITE 
“Annual Report.” Commonwealth War Graves Commission. 2007-2008. 
84 
 
“B. G. Horniman (1873-1948).” India Video: Visual Gateway to India. 
“British Empire: Living in the British Empire – India.” Case Study 4, Background. The National 
Archives. 
Fioritto, Frank. “The Empire on Which the Sun Never Sets.” History of World War II Study 
Programs. May 2019 
“Hartal.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 
“Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?” The National 
Archives. 
Reynolds, Emma. “Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. House of Commons Hansard Meeting. April 9, 
2019. 
Rumsey, David. “Touring Club Italiano: India. Propr. Artistico-letteraria del T.C.I. Ufficio 
cartografico del T.C.I.” World Atlas, 1929. 93-94. 
Tharoor, Shashi. “Why the Indian Soldiers of WW1 were Forgotten,” BBC News, July 1, 2015. 

































































225 Map of India in 1929 provided in Atlas by “India. Propr. Artistico-letteraria del T.C.I. Ufficio cartografico del 
T.C.I.” 
